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Abstract:
The overall importance of capital market communication has increased hand in hand with the 
development of the economic importance of the capital market itself. Equity investors use vari-
ous information sources, such as management reports, consolidated financial statements, in-
vestor relation presentations, and web pages, to prepare and assess investment decisions. This 
cumulative dissertation consists of four manuscripts that analyses different group accounting 
related aspects of the capital market communication. The first two manuscripts are classified 
as contributions to the understanding of current IFRS topics in capital market communication. 
These manuscripts are case-based instructional resources and deal with group accounting de-
cisions on financial instruments and consolidation issues. The second part of the dissertation 
comprises empirical analyses on financial KPI reporting across different parts of capital market 
communication. The manuscripts provide empirical analysis of the consistent use of financial 
KPIs across the different parts of capital market communication, the determinants of consistent 
KPI reporting and the value relevance.
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1 Introduction 
In the conceptual framework of the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) states that financial 
reporting under the IFRS should provide users with decision-usefulness infor-
mation for buying and selling decisions of securities. Equally important and de-
rived from this central objective financial reporting should give investors infor-
mation with which to assess the management’s stewardship role (IASB, 2010). 
Both objectives are relevant in research discussions (Cascino et al., 2014) and are 
central to a secular discussion on the usefulness of financial reporting in general 
(Soll, 2014). Furthermore the disintegration of capital provider and management 
and the resulting agency cost stemming from the information asymmetry between 
insiders (management) and outsiders (capital provider) spurs the continuous im-
provement of accounting standards as the basis of efficient capital market com-
munication (CFA, 2013) to achieve the stated conceptual framework objectives. 
In the last two decades, more than 100 countries switched from national to inter-
national standards (IFRS Foundation, 2016a). The adoption of the IFRS as the 
obligatory accounting regulation for consolidated financial statements for listed 
companies in the European Union in 2005 can be seen as one of the most im-
portant milestones of the global harmonization of capital market oriented account-
ing standards. In the meantime, more than 24,000 capital market oriented compa-
nies worldwide use the IFRS for financial reporting purposes (IFRS Foundation, 
2016b). The IASB intends to provide capital market actors with a set of high qual-
ity accounting standards and tries to improve these continuously (IASB, 2010). 
The capital market orientation of the IFRS is underpinned by the close coopera-
tion between the IASB and the independent Capital Market Advisory Committee 
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(CMAC)1 that supports the standard-setting process with insights about specific 
investors’ needs. 
Although the official work plan of the IASB includes various standard-setting 
projects, two important ones stand out: (1) a project on the improvement of group 
accounting standards that regulate consolidated financial statements and related 
disclosures of interests in other entities (IFRS 10 “Consolidated Financial State-
ments”; IFRS 11 “Joint Arrangements” and IFRS 12 “Disclosure of Interests in 
Other Entities”) and (2), a project on the accounting treatment of financial instru-
ments (IFRS 9 “Financial Instruments”). The first project clarified and improved 
the group accounting standards. The question of how to account for an investment 
is not just highly complex in practice, but also of the utmost importance for the 
capital market communication of the reporting entity. Depending on the invest-
ment categorization decisions, the consolidated revenue and operating income can 
vary significantly. Consequently, the consolidated financial statements constitute 
the basis for economic decisions from capital providers. It is also the basis for key 
performance indicators to assess the business performance and the stewardship of 
the management. The second project aimed to improve the complex accounting 
treatment of financial instruments. Over the last decade, the IASB overhauled the 
accounting standards on financial instruments completely. The overhaul of the 
accounting standards IAS 32 “Financial Instruments: Presentation”, IFRS 7 “Fi-
nancial Instruments: Disclosures” and IFRS 9 “Financial Instruments” moved the 
accounting treatment of financial instruments towards a more principle-based ap-
                                               
1
 According to the IFRS homepage the “[…] Capital Markets Advisory Committee (CMAC) was 
created as a body that would be independent of the IASB and the IFRS Foundation, with the spe-
cific aim to provide the IASB with regular input from the international community of users of 
financial statements.” - http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IASB/Advisory-
bodies/CMAC/Pages/CMAC.aspx  
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proach, but the application is still perceived as quite complex. The importance of 
these accounting standards for capital market communication can be exemplified 
by the role the standards IAS 32 and IFRS 9 play in determining the loss-
absorption capacity of a reporting entity by regulating the classification of capital 
issuances as equity or debt. The resulting capital structure is pivotal for capital 
providers in assessing the financial position of the reporting entity (Cascino et al., 
2014). 
The overall importance of capital market communication has increased hand in 
hand with the development of the economic importance of the capital market it-
self. According to the OECD, the financial assets held by institutional investors in 
OECD countries increased considerably from 110% of the GDP in 1995 to 163% 
of the GDP in 2005 (OECD, 2008). Equity investors use various information 
sources, such as management reports, consolidated financial statements, investor 
relation presentations, and web pages, to prepare and assess investment decisions 
(Cascino et al. 2014). The different parts of capital market communication draw 
heavily on key performance indicators (KPIs) as firm- or industry-specific 
measures of performance evaluation and stewardship assessment (Elzahar et al., 
2015). Although the usage of KPIs attracts increased attention from regulatory 
authorities and standard-setting bodies (ESMA, 2015), the level of consistency 
across different parts of capital market communication, the determinants and the 
value relevance of KPI reporting quality have so far not been thoroughly analyzed 
in academic literature. 
This cumulative dissertation consists of four manuscripts. The first two manu-
scripts are classified as contributions to the understanding of current IFRS topics 
in capital market communication (Part 1). These manuscripts are case-based in-
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structional resources. Manuscript A “The success Story of International Addi-
tives Producer AG – A Case Study on Categorization of Investments under 
IFRS” provides a comprehensive overview of the importance and complexity of 
group accounting decisions and the resulting consequences on capital market 
communication and management incentives. Manuscript B “The Hardest Cycle 
Climb at TCC – A Financial Instruments Case” discusses the intertwining con-
sequences of financial instrument accounting and corporate restructuring deci-
sions in the decision framework of capital providers as a case study. The second 
part of the dissertation comprises empirical analyses on financial KPI reporting 
across different parts of capital market communication. Manuscript C “Determi-
nants of Consistent Capital Market Communication: Evidence from Germa-
ny” provides an empirical analysis of the consistent use of financial KPIs across 
the different parts of capital market communication and the determinants of con-
sistent KPI reporting. Lastly, Manuscript D “The Capital Market Relevance of 
Consistent Key Performance Indicator Reporting: Preliminary Evidence 
from Germany” builds on the analysis of the previous manuscript and develops 
the empirical analyses further to highlight the value relevance of consistent KPI 
reporting. 
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Figure 1: Overview of the dissertation  
IV. 
 Overview of the Dissertation „Group Accounting in the Field of Ten-
sion between Capital Market Communication and IFRS“ I. 
Essays on  
IFRS Topics 
Essays on  
Capital Market Communication Issues 
Manuscript A 
The Success Story of Interna-
tional Additives Producer AG – 
A Case Study on Categoriza-
tion of Investments under IFRS 
II. 
Manuscript B 
The Hardest Cycle Climb at 
TCC –  
A Financial Instruments Case 
III. 
Manuscript C 
Determinants of Consistent 
Capital Market Communica-
tion: Evidence from Germany 
Manuscript D 
The Capital Market Relevance 
of Consistent Key Performance 
Indicator Reporting: Prelimi-
nary Evidence from Germany 
V. 
Current Status:  
Published in in the Journal of Accounting 
Education (ISSN 0748-5751) (VHB-Jourqual 
3: C) in January 2016. 
Current Status: 
Accepted for presentation at the annual Ameri-
can Accounting Association Conference on 
Teaching and Learning in Accounting 2016 in 
New York. 
Current Status: 
Accepted for presentation at the 12th workshop 
on European Financial Reporting at the Univer-
sity of Fribourg in Switzerland in September 
2016 and published as SSRN working paper. 
Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2823404. 
Current Status: 
Working Paper 
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2 Overview and Findings of the Manuscripts 
Manuscript A “The Success Story of International Additives Producer AG – A 
Case Study on Categorization of Investments under IFRS” provides a com-
prehensive overview of the new consolidation standards under the IFRS and re-
quires students to evaluate and discuss different group accounting scenarios in the 
light of capital market expectations and managerial incentives. The instructional 
resource is based around a company called International Additives Producer AG 
(IAP) that recently announced ambitious forecasts regarding revenue and operat-
ing income to the capital market. These key performance indicators depend on the 
way IAP’s investments are currently accounted for in its consolidated financial 
statements, which are questioned by the newly appointed auditor. In this context, 
the case requires the application of the relevant IFRS regarding the categorization 
of investments for group reporting purposes. Specifically, Part I requires the ap-
plication of the control concept of IFRS 10 as well as the classification rules of 
IFRS 11 for joint arrangements, while Part II introduces the assessment of signifi-
cant influence according to IAS 28. The case nurtures the critical thinking of stu-
dents in respect of economic consequences triggered by technical accounting de-
cisions. Through this goal, the case enhances the understanding of the economic 
concepts and theories that underlie financial reporting (see Barth, 2008). Previous 
cases (e.g. Carslaw & Purvis, 2007; Nurnberg & Schaefer, 2010; Kratchmann & 
Smith, 2011) focus on consolidation issues without embedding it in the contextual 
background of managerial incentives and capital market expectations. 
After several successful implementations of the instructional resources at the 
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management in various accounting courses, the 
manuscript was published in the Journal of Accounting Education (ISSN 0748-
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5751) (VHB-Jourqual 3: C) in January 2016. The manuscript is co-authored with 
Henning Zülch and Torben Teuteberg. The development of the research question 
as well as the design and preparation of the manuscript, including the case study, 
teaching notes as well as recommended solutions, has been conducted collabora-
tively by Torben Teuteberg and the author of this dissertation. Henning Zülch 
provided supervision and mentoring throughout the manuscript development pro-
cess. 
Manuscript B  “The Hardest Cycle Climb at TCC – A Financial Instruments 
Case” is built around TCC AG, a fast-growing bicycle production company head-
ed by an ambitious top management team aiming to reinforce the growth strategy 
with a sophisticated financial funding scheme. Building the case on a corporate 
restructuring scenario allows the lecturer to discuss the interdependencies between 
complex accounting for financial instruments, the mechanisms of financial re-
structurings, and related theories on capital structure. To achieve this, students 
need to apply their knowledge to a diverse set of case scenarios involving finan-
cial instruments and are challenged by considering the wider economic conse-
quences resulting from TCC’s corporate funding strategy. Although there are case 
studies that cover the accounting treatment of capital measures, such as stock 
buybacks (Kimmel & Warfield 2008; Mohrmann & Stuerke 2014) or preferred 
stock issuances (Margheim 2008), all these cases deal with isolated accounting 
decisions. This manuscript is the first comprehensive educational resource that 
deals with complex financial instrument accounting according to the IFRS in a 
financial restructuring case environment. The case targets the specific needs of an 
integrative accounting and finance curriculum, raising students’ awareness of the 
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economic consequences of accounting decisions (Bianco, Levy, Marcel, Nixon, & 
Osterheld 2014). 
To date, the author of this dissertation has successfully implemented the case 
study three times at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management in the M.Sc. 
program. The manuscript has also been submitted to Issues in Accounting Educa-
tion (ISSN 0739-3172) (VHB-Jourqual 3: C). Having received constructive feed-
back, the manuscript was revised, whereafter it was submitted and accepted for 
presentation at the annual American Accounting Association Conference on 
Teaching and Learning in Accounting 2016 in New York. The authors intend to 
submit the revised paper to the Journal of Accounting Education (ISSN 0748-
5751) (VHB-Jourqual 3: C). The manuscript is co-authored with Henning Zülch 
and Josefine Böhm. The development of the research question as well as the de-
sign and preparation of the manuscript, including the case study, teaching notes as 
well as recommended solutions, was conducted collaboratively by Josefine Böhm 
and the author of this dissertation. Henning Zülch provided supervision and men-
toring throughout the manuscript development process. 
Manuscript C “Determinants of Consistent Capital Market Communication: 
Evidence from Germany” investigates the level of consistency in using financial 
key performance indicators (KPIs) in capital market communication in Germany 
and examines determinants of consistent KPI reporting. We developed three 
unique item-based disclosure indices to analyze the consistency of capital market 
communication of German companies spanning the period from 2009 to 2014: 
Consistency index for management report (CIMR); Consistency index for annual 
report (CIAR); Consistency index for capital market communication (CICMC). The 
indices are built on each other: the CIMR covers the management report according 
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to HGB, while the CIAR measures the consistency of the annual report, including 
the CIMR and the KPI reporting of the segment reporting according to IFRS 8 of 
the consolidated financial statements. The CICMC covers the annual report, includ-
ing the management report and segment reporting, plus the investor relations 
presentations for year-end earning calls. We find a high level of inconsistency in 
financial KPI reporting concerning all three analyzed parts of capital market 
communication. The average consistency in the period 2009 to 2014 was 46% for 
CIMR, 50% for CIAR, and 50% for CICMC. Broadly speaking, the companies dis-
cussed and reported the KPIs only in 46% or 50% of cases in which the discussion 
and reporting would have been appropriated. We are able to show that the level of 
consistency improved from 2009 to 2014. Our multivariate analysis indicates that 
since the application of an improved German Accounting Standard (GAS 20) on 
management reporting in 2013, the level of KPI disclosure consistency has in-
creased significantly. We also find evidence that companies with a high number of 
financial KPIs, and therefore a high level of reporting complexity, achieve higher 
consistency than companies with fewer than the average number of financial 
KPIs. In line with other empirical studies, we find support for the hypothesis that 
profitable companies on average report higher quality information (e.g. Akhtarud-
din, 2005; Hossain & Mitra, 2004; Karim, 1996).  
Our results support the IASB by drafting an internationally accepted accounting 
standard on management reports, which should be a big step towards eliminating 
inconsistency between KPI definitions in various reporting regulations. The find-
ing that the GAS 20 clarification on management reporting significantly improved 
consistency confirms this argument. The findings regarding the firm-specific 
characteristics that drive consistency should help standard setters and regulatory 
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bodies to improve the regulatory setting of KPI reporting. Of particular interest 
should be the finding that firm size is not a strong explanatory variable of con-
sistent reporting. 
The manuscript is intended for publication in a scientific accounting journal such 
as Accounting in Europe (ISSN 1744-9480) (VHB-Jourqual 3: C). The submis-
sion is planned soon after the dissertation is completed. An earlier version of this 
manuscript was accepted for presentation at the 12th workshop on European Fi-
nancial Reporting at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland in September 2016 
and has been published at the Social Science Research Network (www.ssrn.com). 
The paper is co-authored with Stephanie Jana and Henning Zülch. The develop-
ment of the research question, the execution and discussion of the multivariate 
analysis, and the preparation of the manuscript were conducted by the author of 
this dissertation. Stephanie Jana was mainly involved in the preparation of the 
structured literature review of this study. Henning Zülch provided supervision and 
mentoring throughout the manuscript development process. 
Manuscript D “The Capital Market Relevance of Consistent Key Perforamnce 
Indicator Reporting: Preliminary Evidence from Germany” provides prelimi-
nary empirical evidence of the economic consequences of consistent KPI report-
ing by German companies. To test consistent KPI reporting, I use self-constructed 
consistency indices of the largest German listed companies, as introduced by Jana 
et al. (2016). Following other empirical studies on the economic effects of disclo-
sure quality, I measure firm value as the ratio of market value of equity to the 
book value of equity (Hassan et al., 2009; Lang et al., 2003). My results do not 
show a significant association between firm value and the level of consistency in 
the management report (CIMR) and capital market communication (CICMC). The 
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results regarding CIAR show a negative significant relationship between the level 
of consistency in the annual report and the firm value. Although these results con-
tradict my original hypotheses that consistent KPI reporting has a positive impact 
on the market value of a company, I am able to put these findings into perspective. 
In particular, I argue that a main limitation of my sample is the relatively high 
analyst following of our analysed companies. Due to the advanced financial profi-
ciency of financial analysts, a link between the disclosure quality of capital market 
communication and firm value can be statistically insignificant (Botosan, 1997). 
Furthermore, I argue that the negative links between consistent KPI reporting can 
be explained by management incentives to hide KPI information for profitable 
segments in capital market communication (Bugeja et al., 2015). I suggest future 
research directions based on these findings. 
The manuscript is still a working paper. It is the intention of the submitting candi-
date to revise and develop the manuscript with members of the Chair of Account-
ing and Auditing at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management. 
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Figure 2: Results of the dissertation  
IV. 
Overview of the Dissertation „Group Accounting in the Field of  
Tension between Capital Market Communication and IFRS“ I. 
Essays on IFRS Topics Essays on Capital Market  Communciation Issues 
 
Manuscript A 
The Success Story of Interna-
tional Additives Producer AG – 
A Case Study on Categoriza-
tion of Investments under IFRS 
II. 
 
Manuscript B 
The Hardest Cycle Climb at 
TCC –  
A Financial Instruments Case 
III. 
 
Manuscript C 
Determinants of Consistent 
Capital Market Communica-
tion: Evidence from Germany 
 
Manuscript D 
The Capital Market Relevance 
of Consistent Key Performance 
Indicator Reporting: Prelimi-
nary Evidence from Germany 
V. 
Methodology: Case study 
Result: Comprehensive instructional resource 
to study the technical details of investment 
categorization and the link between group 
accounting and capital market communication. 
Methodology: Case study 
Result: Integrative teaching resource that 
illustrates and creates awareness for the eco-
nomic consequences of technical accounting 
decisions in corporate restructuring environ-
ments. 
Methodology: Multivariate analysis 
Result: Despite a recent improvement, there is 
still a high level of inconsistency in KPI report-
ing in Germany. Profitable companies and 
companies with a relatively high number of 
KPIs report more consistently than other firms. 
Methodology: Multivariate analysis 
Result: Large German listed companies suffer 
no negative market reaction from inconsistent 
KPI reporting. The result points to empirical 
research on smaller listed companies with a 
lower financial analyst following. 
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Abstract 
TCC AG is a fast-growing bicycle production company and is headed by an ambi-
tious top management team which wants to reinforce the expansion strategy with 
a sophisticated financial funding scheme. However, as a result of a steep decline 
in profits, the finance strategy unexpectedly poses an existential threat to TCC. 
Complex accounting questions which TCC’s top management consequently has to 
face include the likely breach of a financial covenant, the detailed contractual 
clauses of a prospectus and the execution of a debt-for-equity swap. The account-
ing requirements cover the recognition, the measurement and the disclosures of 
non-derivative financial instruments according to International Financial Report-
ing Standards (IFRS). To foster a holistic understanding of financial instruments, 
the educational resource further combines the accounting concepts with related 
corporate finance theory. With this integrative approach, the case intends to en-
courage students’ critical reflection upon the far-reaching economic consequences 
resulting from accounting decisions. 
 
 
Keywords:  Financial instruments, restructuring, debt-for-equity swap, covenant, 
IFRS 
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1 Case 
1.1 Introduction 
From his office, Stephen Mayer was watching the third shift of workers arriving at 
the site of “The Cycle Company” – TCC in short – Germany’s leading bicycle 
manufacturer. Located in the sleepy town of Teterow, out in the county in Meck-
lenburg-Western Pomerania, TCC was not only the most important employer of 
the region but also received exceptional news coverage. With its successful turna-
round strategy from a low-cost bicycle producer to Germany’s avant-garde manu-
facturer of high-quality and electric bikes, TCC regularly hit the national head-
lines of the leading business newspapers reading:  
[Figure 1 about here] 
For TCC to accomplish its turnaround strategy, significant investments into 
new production lines and software as well as the acquisition of a startup company 
were necessary. To raise the required funding, various external sources had to be 
tapped introducing a new complexity to TCC’s corporate finance and accounting 
departments. Working long hours had therefore become the new norm for Ste-
phen, the CFO of TCC. However, tonight Stephen is observing the working crowd 
with a, for him, unusual trace of resignation as July 15, 2014 could enter into 
TCC’s history as the sudden turning point of its success story. 
 In the afternoon, the German postal service announced that it had started to 
develop and produce its own bike series for its crew of postmen. Consequently, 
neither the envisaged regular production of 20 000 high-quality bikes nor the spe-
cial order of 15 000 e-bikes would be allocated to TCC. The cancelation came as a 
shock since the German postal service had been one of TCC’s major clients. They 
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had regularly ordered a great batch of custom-made bicycles that were expected to 
contribute nearly 30% of revenues and 50% of profits in 2014.  
 An emergency meeting with Peter Schulz, head of accounting, uncovered 
even more bad news: Due to the drastic collapse in forecasted income, some of 
TCC’s contractual loan agreements would be breached triggering the early re-
payment of a significant share of the company’s debt by the end of the year. After 
the evening session with Peter, Stephen was sorting his thoughts trying to find a 
way out of the seemingly hopeless situation that could drive TCC into bankruptcy. 
Although he felt tired of going through the corporate finance toolbox again to 
make TCC’s strategy work, he was sure that capital and financial restructuring 
measures would be at the very top of his agenda for the coming months. 
 A knock on the door from his personal assistant, who wanted to call it a 
day, interrupted his pondering: “Could you just get me Thomas on the phone be-
fore leaving?” Stephen needed to desperately discuss his thoughts with someone. 
After three rings, Thomas answered the phone with “Silverman Sachs, capital 
markets advisory, Thomas Claasen speaking.” – “Hi Thomas, this is Stephen.” 
1.2 Background 
Founded as a family business in the 1870s, TCC had produced bicycles consist-
ently for the past 140 years spanning all different kinds of clients from the Prus-
sian postal service in the Wilhelminian era to the racing cyclists of the 1972 
Summer Olympics. In the 1990s, TCC shifted its focus from the complete produc-
tion of two-wheelers to the pure assembly of bicycle parts that, in the course of 
globalization, could be imported at a much lower cost from the Eastern European 
and Asian markets.  
The Hardest Cycle Climb at TCC – A Financial Instruments Case 
106 
 
 Following a mass production approach, TCC continuously expanded its 
output and gained a market share of a quarter of the total German bicycle produc-
tion. Thereby, the majority of TCC’s production output consisted of low-budget 
city and mountain bikes that were sold to German discounter chains. To generate 
profits in this very low margin business, the assembly processes were geared to-
wards efficiency and working capital management was declared a top priority. 
Nevertheless, to secure favorable pricing in the international markets, bicycle 
parts were procured in batches weighting heavily on TCC’s inventory position 
while the payment terms were largely dictated by the discounter chains limiting 
TCC’s influence upon receivables.  
 Although TCC generated positive returns due to its large production output 
und the resulting economies of scale, profits had stagnated in recent years. To 
trigger a new phase of earnings growth, TCC decided in 2011 to exploit the poten-
tial of higher priced racing and city bikes. Industry experts had long predicted 
great expansion opportunities in this segment as the two-wheeler was expected to 
turn into a lifestyle product. Convinced of the growth outlook; TCC started build-
ing a new assembly line that – with the promise of regional job creation – was 
financed by the business development bank of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. 
 While the construction proceeded smoothly, the company faced great chal-
lenges with designing a lifestyle product, establishing it in the market and finding 
the appropriate distribution channels. Only with the German postal service could a 
major order be arranged that was in need of high-quality, tailor-made bicycles for 
its crew of postmen. To advance its product placement capabilities and polish up 
its stale brand reputation, TCC acquired the trendy Berlin-based bike and e-bike 
startup, ESpeed, in June 2012. The transaction was financed with the stock-listing 
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of TCC in the beginning of 2012 that was also used by the then controlling share-
holders to exit their engagement. Due to the good relation to the target, the takeo-
ver was executed in a timely fashion and all accounting implications were pro-
cessed by the end of 2013. 
 As part of the takeover agreement, the target’s founder, Andreas Mann, 
became the new CEO of TCC and the personifying figure of the company’s turna-
round strategy. As the CEO’s first act, ESpeed’s well-known brands were rolled 
out in TCC’s new production facilities, multiplying the output of the highly de-
manded bikes. To further integrate and expand ESpeed’s margin-rich e-bike pro-
duction, Andreas Mann was planning on a second new assembly line to be built in 
2014, for which funding was still needed. Since TCC’s cash reserves were 
strained by the interest payments for the loan of the business development bank, 
external funds would need to be raised in order to stabilize TCC’s financial situa-
tion and to invest in the next expansion phase. 
 TCC has a credit rating of BBB- and prepares its consolidated financial 
statements according to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
Its fiscal year covers the months from January to December. 
1.3 One Year Ahead of the Crisis… 
Since nine o’clock sharp, Stephen was waiting for the CEO, Andreas Mann, 
known as Andy, who was already running five minutes late. The two had arranged 
an appointment to go over Andy’s storyline for the meeting with Thomas Claasen.  
Thomas was an old university friend from Stephen’s days at EAA Business 
School who was now working in the capital markets advisory division of the in-
vestment bank Silverman Sachs in London. Just three months ago, they had met at 
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an alumni gathering in Barcelona, where Thomas talked extensively about his new 
girlfriend and to Stephen’s greater interest, about his unusually empty deal pipe-
line. 
 When Stephen told him that TCC was in need of capital to finance its e-
bike expansion strategy, they decided to stay in close contact and after consulta-
tions with Andy set up a meeting in TCC’s headquarters for today, September 12, 
2013 at 11 am. Stephen felt very content about the forthcoming collaboration with 
Thomas as, on the one hand, he trusted in the fairness and support of his old uni-
versity friend during the deal. On the other hand, Silverman Sachs was one of the 
best known market intermediaries providing TCC access to a promising pool of 
funding. Just recently, Silverman Sachs had launched a new broker platform tar-
geted at companies in the lower ranks of investment grade ratings. In times of zero 
interest yields, investors’ increasing risk appetite encouraged such placements and 
Thomas was keen to stand up as a rainmaker and present TCC in front of the 
board of Silverman Sachs. 
 Ten minutes past nine, the bell of the elevator rang and Andy exited ac-
companied by the newest trial version, the trendy e-bike TX5005 that he was test-
ing as a pilot driver. In a good mood, he passed his personal assistant and entered 
his office greeting Stephen with a: “Sorry for running late, so much traffic this 
morning!” Stephen tried his best to respond with a smile as one actually needed to 
search for cars on the empty roads of Teterow. After Andy’s obligatory first cup 
of coffee, the two finally got down to preparing today’s presentation. 
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1.3.1 The Funding Tactics 
For Thomas to get a more detailed picture of the company, a virtual data 
room was established containing all types of documents like TCC’s annual re-
ports, its recent budget plans, its loan contracts and its articles of association. Alt-
hough Stephen knew most of these documents, he also needed to prepare for the 
meeting. First and foremost, he had to gain a better understanding of how the dif-
ferent types of funding instruments would affect TCC’s corporate finances. He 
was especially focused on the leverage ratio, as he knew that an increase would 
further deteriorate TCC’s rating and raise its capital costs due to the adverse ef-
fects of indebtedness. 
 To enter the negotiations thoroughly prepared, Stephen instructed Peter 
Schulz, head of accounting, to evaluate the most likely funding scenarios. Peter 
explained during the CFO briefing that in a first scenario a bond could be issued. 
This would raise TCC’s leverage ratio and as the instrument was expected to trade 
on the broker platform of Silverman Sachs, the bond enter the balance sheet at its 
prevailing market value in each reporting date. Any fair value adjustments would 
be included in the income statement and change the amount of equity thus impact-
ing TCC’s leverage ratio. Although Stephen knew it would be an uphill battle to 
explain to the other executive board members why the fair value adjustments im-
pact TCC’s financial performance, he was convinced that issuing a bond on the 
broker platform would be proof of TCC’s professionalism in the corporate finance 
sphere. 
 Regarding the capital costs of the instrument, Peter was advocating a zero 
bond to avoid further straining the company’s cash flows on top of all the ongoing 
investments. Nevertheless, a zero bond – of this Peter was sure – would still im-
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pact the income statement although no cash interest payments would occur. As 
soon as the terms were known, he would definitely need to dive into the exact 
calculation approach!  
 In a second scenario, Peter was considering a mezzanine funding instru-
ment called a participation certificate that was a particularity of the German capi-
tal markets. The certificate’s payments were usually fixed but also included a step 
up clause in the form of a right to participate in a company’s profits. Peter recalled 
that this alternative construct would classify as equity if (1) the maturity of the 
participation certificate was perpetual, (2) TCC held the right to terminate the cer-
tificate and (3) the full amount of payments was triggered by the distribution of 
dividends to common shareholders. 
 The head of accounting proclaimed that the charm of the latter solution 
was twofold: On the one hand, the equity instrument would improve TCC’s capi-
tal structure due to its classification as equity. On the other hand, the full amount 
of annual costs could be influenced by TCC because the participation rights would 
be directly linked to the company’s dividend policy. Peter dived further into the 
logic explaining that in years of greater investment needs, TCC could decrease its 
distributions to shareholders and in this way, also lowers its payments to partici-
pation holders. Therefore, TCC would be able to retain enough capital to internal-
ly fund its strategic initiatives – also with the participation certificates! Combined 
with the infinite lifetime of the mezzanine instrument that could be terminated 
only by TCC the contractual obligation for repayment could be managed very 
flexibly.  
 Even without looking into the numbers, the outlined options mixed with 
the accounting jargon sounded quite complex to Stephen. For the negotiations 
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with Thomas, he decided to stick to his key take-away of Peter’s briefing, namely 
to link the annual repayments of the new investments to TCC’s dividends. To Ste-
phen, this appeared to be the optimal financing strategy as it would grant the com-
pany a great degree of financial leeway in the years of its ambitious e-bike expan-
sion project.  
1.3.2 The Negotiation 
Thomas arrived punctually at the production site with a cab from Rostock 
airport. Stephen greeted him personally at the entrance of the administration tower 
and guided him up to the conference room, where Andy was already waiting. Af-
ter distributing the slides and going through the agenda, Stephen handed over to 
the CEO who started to supplement the sales figures with his story on TCC’s past 
turnaround strategy from a producer of low-budget to high-quality bikes. He con-
tinued his presentation by talking about the next milestone: the expansion into the 
e-bike segment that was expected to generate sales of 40 000 e-bikes in 2014 and 
80 000 by 2018.  
 With the intention of preparing the following negotiation session, Stephen 
politely interrupted the strategic part of the presentation leading over to the finan-
cials with the question: “And what does the boost in sales mean for TCC’s re-
sults? This brings us to the next slide.” 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 Stephen illustrated that with the expansion into the margin-richer e-bike 
segment, TCC would not only expand its total volumes sold but also planned to 
double its EBITDA results with a target of €10 million for 2014 and net income of 
€5.4 million. For the following years, the slide showed a continuous increase in 
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EBITDA and net income, of which more than half was assumed to be distributed 
to TCC’s shareholders. Stephen used the promising profit forecasts to announce 
his proposal: “With TCC’s growth outlook, we see great potential for investors to 
participate in the company’s success and therefore, suggest funding our capital 
needs with participation certificates.”  
 Thomas seemed surprisingly content about the proposal, but asked for a 
short break to undertake some calculations mumbling: “Assuming a nominal 
amount of €35 million, a risk-adjusted interest rate of approximately 7% and a 
maturity of five years…” After a couple of minutes, the negotiations resumed. 
Thomas reopened the meeting explaining that the terms looked acceptable to him 
but as Silverman Sachs would underwrite the issue he needed to reconfirm with 
the risk guys back in London. From experience, he was already sure that they 
would want a covenant as to better monitor the financial situation of TCC for the 
duration of the investment. 
 Concretely, Thomas was advocating the interest coverage ratio, being de-
fined as EBITDA over total interest expenses, as a covenant. To bring the well-
developing negotiations to a concise conclusion, Stephen reassured that such a 
contractual add-on should not be a problem. TCC was already following this ratio 
very closely in its internal reporting systems because of its loan agreements with 
the business development bank of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. 
 Thomas remembered having seen the loan documentation in the data room 
but asked Stephen to remind him of the exact conditions. The CFO recalled the 
key points of the contract: “€10 million borrowed in January 2011 at an annual 
interest rate of 7% and with a maturity of 10 years including the covenant ratio 
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EBITDA over net interest expenses with a threshold level of 350%. If the ratio 
falls below this level, the bank has the right to withdraw its funding.”   
 Again Thomas sank into calculations, but after a few seconds concluded: 
“Ok, that should be fine. We would include a not that restrictive threshold level of 
250%. As to the other terms, I will talk to my colleagues and get back to you, Ste-
phen, with the final terms within the next weeks.” After closing the meeting, 
Andy insisted on showing Thomas the production facilities. However, Thomas 
had to catch the next flight and get back to his office for an all-nighter.  
 One week later, Thomas sent the contract and the prospectus for the up-
coming road shows. In his e-mail, he expressed his confidence in being able to 
raise the €25 million within the coming months or during the expected Christmas 
rally, at the latest. For its advisory and issuance services, Silverman Sachs would 
charge a transaction fee of 1% of the nominal value of the bond.  With the exact 
documentation and a copy of the signed contract in hand, Stephen asked Peter to 
double-check the papers. However, the head of accounting proclaimed not to be 
an expert on the complex classification of financial instruments and proposed to 
get an external opinion. Therefore, Stephen approached a trusted financial auditor 
who directly classified the issued financial instrument as a liability.  
 The CFO was surprised by this outcome as according to the external opin-
ion the initially assumed equity instrument somehow had turned into a financial 
liability. He wondered where Peter had gone wrong in his assessment. Or did Ste-
phen miss out on something amongst all the complex accounting assertions? 
Should he have asked Peter to join the meeting? 
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1.4 Can Financial Restructuring Avert the Crisis 
Stephen was relieved to hear his old friend at the other end of the line and 
continued the conversation: “I am calling as we have a problem here at TCC and 
at this late hour I better get straight to the point.” – “Sure, fire away Stephen. I am 
all ears.” Stephen briefly illustrated the happenings of the day with the order can-
cellations of the German postal service. He knew that he would not need to go 
into the details in order to receive a well-founded advice as Thomas had exten-
sively studied TCC’s financials for the bond issue one year ago.  
 Therefore, Stephen focused his description on the effects of the lost cus-
tomer. He explained that although the negative accounting consequences concern-
ing impairments could be held at a minimum, the sales collapse in the margin-rich 
bikes segment would weigh heavily on the company’s EBITDA figures for 2014 
and the foreseeable future. Combined with the higher interest expenses due to the 
bond issue, TCC’s adjusted forecasts predicted a breach of the loan covenant with 
the business development bank. 
[Table 1 about here] 
  According to the contractual agreements, the breach would grant the 
counterparty the right to reclaim the outstanding loan by the end of the year. 
However, within just four months, TCC would not be able to raise the necessary 
capital especially not in its current operational crisis. Thomas had a fast solution 
at hand: “Get rid of the loan by executing a debt-for-equity swap! The terms are 
much too restrictive – quasi a relic of the financial crisis. However, that said, I 
would not get involved in renegotiations of the conditions or even a postponement 
of the financial covenant. In the end, you might even have to report this mess and 
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thus raise uncertainties in the capital markets. Just get the loan swapped into tan-
gible equity before the end of the reporting period. The number of new shares 
should definitely lie within the ranges of your articles of association so that you 
don’t even need a shareholder vote.”  
[Table 2 about here] 
 To Stephen, the call uncovered a, to date, unconsidered way out of the 
imminent bankruptcy. He asked Thomas to put together an official document with 
a summary of the necessary actions so that Peter could prepare the negotiations 
with the business development bank. Stephen ended the call by insisting on a bill 
for the probably company-saving advice.  
 Calmed down, Stephen left his office shortly before midnight. After a 
good night sleep, he would arrange a meeting with the bank tomorrow. Then, 
TCC’s future and the jobs of 1 200 people would lie in the hands of the county of 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. 
1.5 Requirements 
1.5.1 Presentation of Financial Instruments  
1) Please provide the definition of a financial instrument according to the In-
ternational Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  
2) What are the prerequisites according to IAS 32.11 and IAS 32.16 to classify 
a financial instrument as equity? Please ignore the specific exemptions in 
IAS 32.16A-F for your answer. 
3) Do you agree with Peter that the participation certificate discussed in the 
CFO briefing classifies as equity? For your answer, interpret how the fol-
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lowing three characteristics influence TCC’s contractual obligation accord-
ing to IAS 32.16 (a):  
(1) The issuer’s right to terminate the participation certificate. 
(2) The determination of the amount of the participation. 
(3) The maturity of the participation certificate. 
4) Consider the final terms of the participation certificate in the prospectus  and 
explain:  
(1) Why the financial auditor classifies the participation certificate as a 
liability. 
(2) What role the included financial covenant plays for the classifica-
tion according to IAS 32.25. 
5) What is the correct accounting treatment of the debt-for-equity swap accord-
ing to IFRIC 19? Please provide the booking entries for the transaction de-
tailed in Table 2. 
1.5.2 Measurement of Financial Instruments   
1) Is Peter right that the fluctuating market values of the bond have to be re-
flected in the income statement? What alternative accounting treatment 
would be possible? 
2) Due to the zero bond structure of the bond, TCC has to apply the effective 
interest method according to IFRS 9.B5.4.1-B5.4.7. Please complete the ta-
ble below assuming that no dividends will be paid by TCC for the duration 
of the bond. 
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Fiscal  
Year 
Opening Balance  
in € 
Interest Expenses  
in € 
Closing 
Balance  
in € 
2014    
2015    
2016    
2017    
2018    
 
3) Calculate the interest coverage ratio for the years 2014 and 2015 as defined 
in the prospectus in Figure 3 of the appendix. Include the EBITDA forecasts 
of Figure 2 in your calculations.  
4) How does the sales collapse impact the interest coverage ratio? Please use 
the revised income statement from Table 1 for your calculations. 
1.5.3 Disclosure of Financial Instruments 
1) Why is Thomas pressuring to close the debt-for-equity swap before the end 
of the fiscal year? What disclosures would otherwise be needed according to 
IFRS 7.18-19? 
2) What year-end fair value disclosure would be necessary for the loan accord-
ing to IFRS 7.25? 
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1.5.4 Related Corporate Finance Issues 
1) What is the optimal leverage ratio for TCC according to the Modigliani and 
Miller proposition I? 
2) Please challenge your conclusion from D.1 with the trade-off theory. 
3) What kind of signals do equity issuances convey to the capital market? 
Please discuss your answer within the pecking order theory. 
4) Which corporate finance measure does TCC use to resolve the capital struc-
ture issue? Which of the above capital structure theories best explains TCC 
financial restructuring decision? 
  
The Hardest Cycle Climb at TCC – A Financial Instruments Case 
119 
 
Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Exemplary newspaper excerpts of TCC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
04.07.2011 
20.03.2014 
18.12.2013 
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Figure 2: Selected income positions, 2012-2018e 
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Figure 3: Participation certificate conditions (Excerpts of the prospectus) 
 
 
 
  
 
 Issuer:  The Cycle Company 
Specified Currency:  EURO 
Nominal Amount:  35 000 000 
Issue Amount: 25 000 000   
Issue Date:  01.01.2014 
Maturity Date:  31.12.2019 
Interest Basis:  Zero Coupon  
 
 § 9 
(Termination of Participation Certificates) 
1. During the lifetime of the instrument, TCC reserves the right to terminate 
the participation certificates at the end of each calendar year, with the first 
date being 31.12.2014.  
2. In the event that the interest coverage ratio should amount to less than 
250%, the holder is granted the right to terminate the certificate and de-
mand immediate redemption.  
“Interest coverage” ratio is thereby defined as (1) earnings before inter-
ests, taxation, depreciation and amortization over (2) net interest expenses 
of the consolidated financial statements. Net interest expenses equal the 
sum of all interests, compensations and commissions that relate to the lia-
bilities recognized in the balance sheet, irrelevant of whether these costs 
are capitalized or expensed. 
 
 § 10 
(Determination of Participation Right) 
1. Starting from fiscal year 2014, holders of the certificate will additionally 
receive a right to participate in TCC’s profit development. The yearly 
payment will amount to 35% of paid cash dividends per common share.  
2. Should no dividends be distributed to common shareholders, TCC is also 
not required to make any payments to the holders of the participation cer-
tificate.  
3. In case of a negative consolidated net income, no share of loss will be 
attributed to the holders of the certificate.  
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Table 1: Revised income statement for 2014e 
in 000 € 2014e 
Sales 118 250 
EBITDA          7 328 
EBIT          6 328 
Net Income           3 658 
Dividends                 0 
 
 
Table 2. Term sheet debt-for-equity swap 
in 000 € As of July 2014 
Book Value Loan         10 000 
Fair Value Loan          8 000 
Fair Value of Additional Equity          8 000 
Advisory Fees            100 
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2 Case Learning Objectives and Implementation  
Guidance 
The subsequent sections discuss the motivation, the learning objectives and the 
contribution of the underlying accounting case. Furthermore, we complement our 
assertions with the feedback that was received from students as part of testing the 
effectiveness of our case. In the remainder of the section, we share our experience 
in terms of the successful implementation of the instructional resource. The teach-
ing notes with the recommended solutions to the individual requirements can be 
requested directly from the authors. 
 
2.1 Case Motivation and Learning Objectives 
The case is built around TCC AG, a fast-growing bicycle production company and 
headed by an ambitious top management team which wants to reinforce the 
growth strategy with a sophisticated financial funding scheme. Whereas the char-
acters and the dates of events are fictitious, the accounting challenges resulting 
from financial restructurings are derived from real-life situations. Anchoring the 
case in a corporate scenario of financial distress27 allows the lecturer to discuss the 
interdependencies between the complex accounting for financial instruments, the 
mechanisms of financial restructurings and the related theories on capital struc-
ture. 
                                               
27
  In our definition of “financial distress”, we follow Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2005) who 
state: „Financial distress is a situation where a firm’s operating cash flows are not sufficient to 
satisfy current obligations […]. Financial distress may lead a firm to default on a contract, and 
it may involve financial restructuring between the firm, its creditors, and its equity investors” 
(830). 
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Students are introduced to the commonly applied corporate finance toolset of fi-
nancial covenants and of debt-for-equity swaps. Both play a central role in the 
restructuring context where financial covenants as contractually agreed upon mon-
itors of the borrower’s profit and liquidity situation can act as early warning sig-
nals of potential financial bottlenecks (Nash, Netter, and Poulsen, 2003). Along-
side such measures as time extensions or waivers on debt repayments, debt-for-
equity swaps, on the other hand, represent a common out-of-court procedure to 
revert an imminent illiquidity crisis (Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin 2004). 
Aside from their importance within the realms of financial restructuring, we de-
cided to implement these tools in our story so that an integrated understanding of 
the accounting for financial instruments could be fostered. To achieve this pur-
pose, students need to apply their knowledge to a diverse set of case scenarios 
involving financial instruments and are challenged by considering the wider eco-
nomic consequences resulting for TCC’s corporate funding strategy. A first such 
consequence is triggered by the classification of the newly issued financial in-
strument as a liability (instead of equity) that raises TCC’s interest expenses and, 
combined with the revenue decline, leads to the breach of a financial covenant. 
The infringement, in turn, initiates the need for financial restructuring whereby the 
imminent crisis can be resolved by exchanging the loan into equity. Students are 
thus faced with a reclassification scenario. 
The authors’ teaching experience has shown that students are so caught up in the 
accounting technicalities for financial instruments that they lose sight of the 
broader economic consequences that result from a change in capital structure. In 
order to be well prepared for the practical realities, however, an in-depth 
knowledge of accounting for financial instruments should cover not only their 
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respective recognition and measurement but also their effects for contractual rela-
tions with lenders, for the capital markets communication and for the value of the 
firm itself. Therefore, we chose an integrated case approach that not only spans 
the recognition, measurement and disclosure of financial instruments but also 
shows the economic consequences of accounting decisions. That there is a great 
need for such an integrative approach is emphasized by Bath (2008) who states: 
Financial reporting educators also need to ensure their students learn the 
foundational theories that underlie financial reporting. These theories in-
clude micro- and macro-economics, finance, information economics, the 
role and effects of incentives, rational expectations, and portfolio pricing. 
The conceptual framework states that the objective of financial reporting is 
to provide information useful for making economic decisions (IASB 2001, 
para. 12). Thus, it is clear that understanding economic concepts, including 
those relating to information for investors and creditors, is fundamental to 
understanding financial reporting (1164). 
 
Accordingly, the learning objectives are as follows: 
1. To learn the accounting provisions for non-derivative financial instru-
ments according to IFRS.  
The objective is achieved by applying the accounting standards IAS 32 
and IFRS 9 for the initial recognition and the subsequent measurement of 
non-derivative financial instruments (part A and B of the requirements). 
2. To understand the interlinkages between recognition, measurement and 
disclosure of non-derivative financial instruments under IFRS.  
Students learn that the subsequent measurement of financial instruments is 
determined by their initial recognition (part A and B) and that business inci-
dents trigger disclosure requirements (part C of the requirements). 
3. To raise students’ awareness for the economic consequences of account-
ing decisions on non-derivative financial instruments.  
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This objective is achieved by showing how decisions on the classification 
and measurement of non-derivative financial instruments can affect relations 
with capital providers (in the form of financial covenants – part B) and the 
firm’s capital structure as a whole (part D of the requirements). 
4. To study the common financial restructuring measure of a debt-for-
equity swap and its accompanying accounting treatment.  
Students get to know the common restructuring tool of debt-for-equity 
swaps whose implications are evaluated from both an accounting (part A) as 
well as a corporate finance perspective (part D of the requirements). 
5. To strengthen students’ analytical skills by having them assess different 
negotiation outcomes and the corresponding business consequences.  
With the case, students learn to critically assess different business scenarios 
and are asked to evaluate the outcomes from both an accounting perspective 
(part A) and from a corporate finance perspective (part D of the require-
ments). 
2.2 Case Development and Contribution 
Although the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) has overhauled the 
IFRS on financial instruments completely within the last ten years28, the standards 
still pose a huge challenge for students, practitioners and standard setters. These 
challenges stem from the inherent complexities and the ongoing amendments of 
the financial instrument standards (Ernst & Young 2015). Considering the useful-
                                               
28
  IFRS 7 was published in 2005 and replaced disclosure requirements previously incorporated in 
IAS 32. The IASB subsequently published versions of IFRS 9 that introduced new classifica-
tion and measurement requirements (in 2009 and 2010), a new hedge accounting model (in 
2013) and a final version in July 2014. 
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ness of case-based teaching (see Boyce, Williams, Kelly, and Yee 2001; Chen 
2013) and the aforementioned educational and practical difficulties, the case at 
hand covers the most current IAS/IFRS on financial instruments: IAS 32 “Finan-
cial instruments: presentation”, IFRS 7 “Financial instruments: disclosure” and 
IFRS 9 “Financial instruments”. 
In particular, IAS 32 attracts considerable attention from the standard setters 
and various interest groups (IASB 2008). One of the main reasons is its purpose to 
regulate the recognition of capital issuances as equity or debt in the financial 
statements. Therefore, the standard effectively determines the loss-absorption ca-
pacity of an economic entity. However, despite its central role, the standard is 
difficult to apply due to its widely criticized complexity (IASB 2008; IASB 2009) 
that mainly originates from the casuistic nature of the accounting standard29 which 
as a matter of fact struggles to capture all existing funding structures. Keeping this 
shortcoming in mind, we added specific indications of the relevant accounting 
standards and paragraphs to the case requirements to ensure that students spend 
time on the application of accounting standards instead of on finding the correct 
paragraphs.  
The requirements of part A encourage a detailed discussion on the recogni-
tion of financial instruments (IAS 32) asking students for the definitions of finan-
cial instruments and their applicability. Following the structure of accounting 
standards, the requirements continue with the subsequent measurement (IFRS 9) 
and the notes to the consolidated financial statements (IFRS 7) in parts B and C. 
This integrative approach of combining recognition, measurement and disclosure 
                                               
29
  See, for example, the specific exemptions in IAS 32.16A – F. 
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along one business transaction is often missing in accounting text books and is 
consequently underrepresented in the curricula (Ruhl and Smith 2013). 
As the central means to motivate students’ interest in financial instruments 
accounting, the case highlights the importance of accounting decisions for the 
financial rescue of an operationally and later financially distressed firm (IASB 
2009). All financial measures to avert the imminent illiquidity are centred on the 
core question of TCC’s capital structure and funding strategy. Students working 
on the restructuring case experience how contract details change throughout nego-
tiations and how important a continuous and proactive accounting assessment is 
for a successful financial restructuring. 
There is one strand of recent case studies that covers the accounting treat-
ment of capital measures such as stock buybacks (Kimmel and Warfield 2008; 
Mohrmann and Stuerke 2014) or preferred stocks issuances (Margheim 2008). 
Other cases are centred on derivative accounting as part of hedging relationships 
(Smith and Kolbeck 2008; Ebrahim, Schultz, and Hollister 2010). Whereas all of 
these cases deal with financial instruments, they are mainly focused on isolated 
accounting discussions according to US-GAAP and do not include an assessment 
of the resulting economic consequences. 
To our best knowledge, the case at hand is the first comprehensive educa-
tional resource that deals with the complex financial instrument accounting ac-
cording to IFRS in a financial restructuring case environment. The case targets the 
specific needs of an integrative accounting and finance curriculum raising stu-
dents’ awareness of the economic consequences of accounting decisions (Bianco, 
Levy, Marcel, Nixon, and Osterheld 2014). Therefore, we understand our case as 
an innovative contribution to the existing accounting education literature. 
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2.3 Implementation Guidance 
The case was implemented in the course “Advanced International Financial Re-
porting” within the Master of Sciences program of the authors’ graduate business 
school. The course is an accounting elective with the learning objective to deepen 
students’ understanding of IFRS. Students at this stage of the curriculum are re-
quired to know the accounting basics and to have attended corporate finance clas-
ses dealing with the fundamental theories of capital structure and firm value. If 
students are not familiar with the fundamental theories of capital structure, the 
modular setting of the case requirements allows instructors to remove Part D. 
Nevertheless we encourage instructors to discuss the capital market theories at 
least briefly during the in-class discussion of the case, because the learning out-
come seems – as intended by the case setting – to be positively impacted by inte-
grating capital market theories and financial instruments accounting (see Student 
Assessment). 
We provided students with the case and the relevant accounting standards 
four weeks before discussing the requirements in class. In order to set an incentive 
to work on the case at home and to participate in the case discussion, we informed 
students via the course outline that one-sixth of the final exam would relate to the 
accounting concepts covered by the case. To ensure a level-playing field of basic 
knowledge on the relevant accounting topics, we gave a comprehensive introduc-
tion to accounting for financial instruments one lecture before the in-class discus-
sion. This mandatory preparation session on financial instruments accounting un-
der IFRS took 90 minutes and this was sufficient for discussing all the require-
ments. 
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The discussion revealed that the understanding of the accounting technicali-
ties was significantly improved due to the reflection of the economic consequenc-
es resulting from accounting decisions and judgements. All accounting aspects 
were analysed in the case framework of TCC’s efforts to restructure its financial 
position for future growth. During the entire class, we encouraged students to dis-
cuss the corporate finance implications of the accounting decisions and asked 
whether and how accounting alternatives could be realized by TCC’s manage-
ment. Furthermore, the international heterogeneity of our graduate students in-
spired a discussion of the participation certificate in the context of different corpo-
rate governance structures. Due to the fact that for the majority of the students the 
discussed funding instrument was unknown students had to assess the extracts 
from the prospectus carefully and discuss the accounting consequences intensively 
during the in-class discussion. We asked students exam questions on case-related 
topics like the accounting of a debt-for-equity swap execution and the assessment 
of contractual clauses in regard to the IAS 32 classification. In previous account-
ing classes where no case-based teaching was implemented, the exams results for 
such financial instruments questions were significantly lower than the average 
results in these exams, which is in line with the observation that financial instru-
ments accounting is highly complex (Ernst & Young 2015). Significantly im-
proved exam results and students’ oral feedback during class provided evidence 
that the integrated nature of the case-based teaching helped to achieve this learn-
ing outcome. The effectiveness of the underlying case was, however, further ana-
lysed with a structured survey, the results of which are presented in the following 
section.  
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While the authors chose the in-class discussion for case implementation, the 
structure of the pedagogical resource allows various alternatives. An in-class dis-
cussion that is moderated by the students themselves could be particularly effec-
tive as it would foster an independent elaboration of accounting issues. The an-
swers to the different requirement blocks regarding recognition (A), measurement 
(B), disclosure (C) and corporate finance (D) could be presented by student 
groups via a presentation leaving the interrelations and economic consequences 
for a discussion moderated by the lecturer.  
2.4 Student Assessment 
Following the effectiveness testing of recent case studies, we assessed the peda-
gogical usefulness of the case with a structured survey (see Churyk and Stenka 
2014; Davis and Matson 2014; Holtzblatt and Tschakert 2014). A questionnaire 
with 12 statements similar to the one used by Detzen, Hoffmann and Zülch (2013) 
as well as Detzen, Stork genannt Wersborg and Zülch (2015) was distributed to 
the students after the in-class discussion of the teaching case. Students were asked 
to indicate their level of agreement based on a five-point Likert-type scale from 
one (“Strongly Agree”) to five (“Strongly Disagree”). Table 3 presents the results 
of our survey. 
[Table 1 about here] 
As the table above shows, the vast majority of students expressed the opinion that 
case studies are highly useful (average of 1.25) for learning accounting. Further-
more, statements 2 and 3 of the survey indicate that participants’ knowledge in 
accounting for non-derivate financial instruments according to IFRS was material-
ly improved by the implementation of our case, starting from a rather weak self-
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assessment. Consequently, we see our first formulated learning objective (LO) of 
the case approved by the student-feedback. 
Moreover, the learning experience seemed to be particularly enhanced via embed-
ding related accounting and corporate finance topics in a real world restructuring 
context. The strong results for statements 4 to 6 approve the integrative nature of 
our case that is defined by LO 2 to LO 4. The holistic understanding of financial 
instruments relating to the accounting interlinkages, the respective application to 
the restructuring environment and the resulting economic consequences is, in our 
opinion, highly important for business students to practice because they are likely 
to face such complex situations along their potential career paths in the banking 
and consulting industry. 
Overall, working on case studies in general was perceived as effective (LO 5) and 
the level of difficulty – taking into account the complexity of financial instru-
ments and financial restructuring – was approved as being appropriate. This ap-
propriateness was underpinned by students’ feedback that they spent four hours on 
average preparing the in-class discussion. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Aggregated student responses to questionnaire 
Statement 
 
N = 28 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
Neutral 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
Dis-
agree 
 
 
 
(4) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 
 
(5) 
Average 
 
 
In general, case studies are 
useful for learning accounting. 21 7 0 0 0 1.25 
Prior to the case, my under-
standing of the accounting 
treatment of financial instru-
ments was weak. 
3 17 6 1 1 2.29 
The case increased my 
knowledge of the accounting 
treatment of financial instru-
ments. 
7 18 2 1 0 1.89 
The case study provided "real-
world" application of what I 
learned in class. 
11 12 4 1 0 1.82 
The case required me to inte-
grate knowledge of several 
accounting topics. 
5 14 8 1 0 2.18 
The integration of corporate 
finance topics helped me to 
understand the practical applica-
tion of accounting standards on 
financial instruments. 
9 16 2 1 0 1.82 
The case study was too difficult.  1 5 10 10 2 3.25 
The case was too easy. 0 1 11 12 4 3.68 
Overall, the case provided a 
beneficial learning experience.  7 18 2 1 0 1.89 
Overall, the case study served 
the purpose of this course well. 4 21 2 1 0 2.00 
I enjoyed working on the case 
study. 2 19 5 2 0 2.25 
The case study enhanced my 
problem-solving skills. 2 12 12 2 0 2.50 
Source: Own creation following Detzen et al. (2013; 2015) 
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3 Teaching Notes 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
The following solutions are intended to facilitate the use of the educational re-
source for a case-based and integrative accounting education. The integrative na-
ture of the case allows instructors to use the case study to teach the interrelation-
ship between different accounting topics and corporate finance theories. In partic-
ular the case asks students to work on the recognition, measurement and disclo-
sure of non-derivative financial instruments embedded within a financial restruc-
turing environment.  
We give instructional guidance in italics where helpful. The given instruc-
tional guidance should not be required by students as solutions to the require-
ments. The intention of the instructional guidance is to share teaching experiences 
and the reasoning behind specific requirements. Therefore, the teaching notes are 
solely meant to equip instructors; a distribution to the students is not intended. By 
distributing solutions to the class, the impression might be created that the issues 
are less controversial which undermines the case’s “real-life” approach. Please 
note that the solutions represent solely the personal opinion of the authors. 
 
3.2 Presentation of Financial Instruments  
1) Please provide the definition of a financial instrument according to the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  
In order to lay the foundations for the discussion of the accounting for financial 
instruments, students are requested to define the term “financial instruments” 
according to IAS 32. Although the requirement only asks for the definition ac-
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cording to IAS 32.11, we recommend drawing students’ attention to the im-
portance of the term “contract” and to the definition in IAS 32.13. In particular, 
the understanding of “discretion” and “enforceable by law” is pivotal for an ef-
fective in-class discussion of “contractual obligations” in requirement 3.2.3. 
 
Answer: 
According to IAS 32.11, a financial instrument is any contract that gives rise to a 
financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of anoth-
er entity.  
 The term contract is important to the definition and refers to “an agreement 
between two or more parties that has clear economic consequences that the parties 
have little, if any, discretion to avoid, usually because the agreement is enforcea-
ble by law” (IAS 32.13). 
2) What are the pre-requisites according to IAS 32.11 and IAS 32.16 to 
classify a financial instrument as equity? Please ignore the specific ex-
emptions in IAS 32.16A-F for your answer. 
After providing the general definition of a financial instrument in A.1, the students 
are now asked to describe how an equity instrument is specifically defined under 
IAS 32. The first definition of the requirement according to IAS 32.11 should be 
used to remind students of the basic function of equity as the “residual item” par-
ticularly in the wake of dismantling the respective company (e.g. after financial 
distress). The in-class discussions where the case was tested brought to light that 
students are so focused on the accounting details that they miss the economic 
function and therefore, the real-life importance of the classification of equity in 
business in general (e.g. the loss absorption function of the “residual item”).  
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 The second part of the requirement asks for the definition according to 
IAS 32.16 (excluding exemptions in the paragraphs 16A-F) covering the “con-
tractual obligations” and the “settlement in the issuer’s own equity instruments”. 
The instructor is advised to emphasise that especially the part of the equity defini-
tion in IAS 32.16 (a) regarding the “contractual obligations” are important for 
the coming discussions in the teaching case, due to the utmost importance of the 
concept of contractual obligation in the assessment of an equity instrument under 
IAS 32. 
 The last parts in paragraph IAS 32.16 (b) deal with instruments that are 
settled in the entity’s own equity instruments and usually structured as options 
(see IAS 32.AG27). For pedagogical reasons, we focus on non-settlement struc-
tures as outlined in IAS 32.16 (a) in order to direct students’ awareness to the 
general points of the debt versus equity discussion within the IFRS regime. With 
the same rationale, we left out the specific exemptions in IAS 32.16A-16F. 
Answer: 
An equity instrument is any contract that evidences a residual interest in the assets 
of an entity after deducting all of its liabilities (IAS 32.11). 
The instrument includes no contractual obligation either (IAS 32.16 (a)): 
 to deliver cash or another financial asset to another entity; or 
 to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity un-
der conditions that are potentially unfavourable to the issuer. 
If the instrument will or may be settled in the issuer’s own equity instru-
ments, it is (IAS 32.16 (b)): 
 a non-derivative that includes no contractual obligation for the issuer to 
deliver a variable number of its own equity instruments; or 
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 a derivative that will be settled only by the issuer exchanging a fixed 
amount of cash or another financial asset for a fixed number of its own 
equity instruments. For this purpose, rights, options or warrants to ac-
quire a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments for a fixed 
amount of any currency are equity instruments if the entity offers the 
rights, options or warrants pro rata to all of its existing owners of the 
same class of its own non-derivative equity instruments. 
3) Do you agree with Peter that the participation certificate discussed in 
the CFO briefing classifies as equity? For your answer, interpret how 
the following three characteristics influence TCC’s contractual obliga-
tion according to IAS 32.16 (a):  
Due to the fact that a contractual obligation is the central characteristic for 
whether an instrument is classified as a financial liability or an equity instrument 
according to IAS 32, the following questions (3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.2 and 3.1.3.3) are 
drafted to foster the evaluation of various contract clauses that are usually em-
bedded in mezzanine funding schemes like participation certificates (Ernst & 
Young 2015).  
(1) The issuer’s right to terminate the participation certificate. 
According to information provided in the CFO briefing, it can be assumed that the 
participation certificate is redeemable only at the issuer’s discretion. Consequent-
ly, the certificate contains no contractual obligation according to IAS 32.16 (a) 
(Ernst & Young 2015). 
Answer: 
Peter is correct that TCC’s right to redeem the participation certificate does not 
lead to the classification of a financial liability according to IAS 32 because the 
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redemption is solely at TCC’s discretion and therefore not a “contractual obliga-
tion” to deliver cash. 
(2) The determination of the amount of participation. 
Because the delivery of cash to participation holders is solely linked to the occur-
rence of dividend payments to TCC’s shareholders, the clause does not constitute 
a contractual obligation according to IAS 32.16 (a) (Ernst & Young 2015). We 
recommend discussing this verdict in comparison to dividend payments on ordi-
nary shareholders whereby shareholders can expect a dividend payment from the 
entity in which they own a share but still do not have the “right” to receive them. 
Within the IAS 32 framework this situation does not lead to the classification of 
common shares as financial liabilities. 
Answer: 
Again Peter’s accounting opinion is correct because the payments are at the dis-
cretion of the issuer and the distribution of dividends to ordinary shareholders can 
be suppressed by TCC’s management. Therefore, the “dividend blocker” clause 
does not constitute a contractual obligation. 
(3) The maturity of the participation certificate. 
The maturity of any financial instrument and the resulting legal obligation to re-
pay the outstanding principal amount is the prime example of a contractual obli-
gation to deliver cash according to IAS 32.16 (a). Although not specifically ad-
dressed in the case, the lecturer is encouraged to mention at this point that the 
combination of a perpetual instrument (e.g. perpetual debt without the legal obli-
gation to repay the principal amount) with fixed interest payments (the interest 
payments are not at the management’s discretion) also leads to the classification 
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of a financial liability according to IAS 32 because the coupon payments present 
contractual obligations (IAS 32.AG6). 
Answer: 
In this case Peter’s accounting opinion is correct, because the participation certifi-
cate is perpetual and therefore presents no contractual obligation for TCC to repay 
the bond. 
4) Consider the final terms of the participation certificate in the prospec-
tus and explain:  
The authors’ experience from real-life transactions is that the contractual terms 
of the transaction change throughout the negotiation and this has been imple-
mented in the case to maintain its relevance for practice. Hence, adaptations re-
sult from misunderstandings between TCC’s CEO and the head of accounting. 
With the communication problems, we intend to highlight the importance of an 
integrated understanding of accounting as well as corporate finance issues. Stu-
dents are required to analyse the various outcomes of the negotiation and to ad-
just – if necessary – the accounting treatment.   
i. Why the financial auditor classifies the participation certif-
icate as a liability. 
Although the finite maturity and the financial covenant both independently lead to 
the contractual obligation that forces TCC to classify the participation certificate 
as a financial liability, we recommend discussing only the finite maturity under 
3.1.4.1 at this point. The accounting impact of financial covenants is discussed in 
detail under 3.1.4.2. In the in-class discussion to test the case, we stressed that no 
matter how many criteria in the prospectus are equity-like according to IAS 32 
the existence of only one criterion that creates a contractual obligation is suffi-
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cient to force TCC to classify the instrument as a financial liability according to 
IAS 32.16. 
Answer: 
The contractual obligation to deliver cash in the future (e.g. repaying the bond 
after five years) is a criterion that leads to the liability classification according to 
IAS 32.16 (a). 
ii. What role the included financial covenant plays for the 
classification according to IAS 32.25. 
The accounting standard specifies in IAS 32.25 “Contingent settlement provi-
sions” as uncertain future events that may require the entity to deliver cash or 
another financial asset, leading to the financial liability classification of the con-
cerned instrument. In particular, the standard provides “the issuer’s future reve-
nues, net income or debt-to-equity ratio” as examples for such an event. In ac-
cordance with the IASB example, the teaching case lays out that fundamental rea-
son of the deterioration of TCC’s financial situation are the declining revenues 
due to a customer order cancelation. This loss in revenues eventually triggers the 
covenant breach. 
 At this point of the in-class discussion, we recommend to recap the specific 
terms of the financial covenant (see the definition of the interest coverage ratio in 
figure 3 in the appendix), briefly discuss the economic consequence of a breach 
(e.g. the right of the bank to ask for repayment of the loan) and the rationale be-
hind the covenant from a bank’s perspective (see recommended solution 3.1.4.2). 
In order to ensure that students understand the importance of covenants from a 
corporate finance perspective, we provided them with a definition and common 
characteristics of covenants (see second part of the recommended solution 
3.1.4.2) during the in-class discussion. Moreover, to understand the bank’s inten-
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tion to demand a financial covenant, it is important to interpret two of the listed 
three criteria in IAS 32.25 that could lead to the classification as an equity in-
strument according to IAS 32 despite the existence of a contingent settlement pro-
vision (e.g. financial covenant). 
 First, IAS 32.25 (a) stipulates that if the contingency is “not genuine” then 
it does not lead to the financial liability classification. IAS 32.AG28 defines that 
“not genuine” means that events are extremely rare, highly abnormal and very 
unlikely to occur. Students should understand that the breach of a financial cove-
nant is obviously not highly abnormal because the banks insist on having them 
due to risk management requirements and concrete experiences to incorporate 
these contractual clauses in the loan agreement.  
 Secondly, IAS 32.25 (b) mentions the liquidation of the respective entity as 
contingency that does not lead to the financial liability classification. According 
to the provided prospectus, the repayment of the loan is only connected with the 
covenant breach and not with the liquidation of the company. Moreover, the ra-
tionale of the financial covenant is to trigger the repayment of the loan before 
financial distress hinders the company’s ability to repay the financial liability.  
 The third criterion mentioned in IAS 32.25 (c) specifically deals with the 
exemptions in IAS 32.16A and IAS 32.16B in combination with IAS 32.25. Due to 
the pedagogically motivated scope of the teaching case (as explained in A.2), we 
recommend to skip the criterion in IAS 32.25 (c). 
Answer: 
According to IAS 32.25, the event of the occurrence or non-occurrence of uncer-
tain future events (e.g. lack of future revenues) is beyond TCC’s control. There-
fore, TCC does not have the unconditional right to avoid delivering cash (e.g. re-
pay the loan) in case of a financial covenant breach. 
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Financial Covenants: “A financial covenant is an undertaking given by a 
borrower to its lender to maintain a minimum or maximum level of a financial 
measure such as gearing or net worth or interest cover” (Moir and Sudarsanam 
2007). Covenants are generally defined as additional contractual agreements that 
come in various forms including positive (e.g. the borrower is required to invest 
the borrowed money in a specific asset), negative (e.g. the borrower must not in-
vest the borrowed money in a specific asset) and financial covenants (e.g. interest 
coverage ratio). A breach of an agreed upon debt covenant can give the borrower 
the right to cancel the contract irrespective of the lenders’ ability to repay the 
bond or loan. 
5) What is the correct accounting treatment of the debt-for-equity swap 
according to IFRIC 19? Please provide the booking entries for the 
transaction detailed in Table 2. 
The requirement provides the lecturer with the opportunity to introduce the com-
mon restructuring measure “Debt-for-equity swap” (Weston, Mitchell, and Mul-
herin 2004), including the required accounting treatment according to the IFRS. 
Furthermore, the requirement gives the lecturer the chance to briefly explain the 
role of the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) 
within the rules-based IFRS framework. The IASB explains “The objectives of the 
Interpretations Committee are to interpret the application of IFRS, provide timely 
guidance on financial reporting issues that are not specifically addressed in IFRS 
[…]” (IASB 2015). Because neither IAS 32 nor IFRS 9 specifically deal with the 
accounting treatment of the extinguishment of a financial liability due to the issue 
of equity instruments to the creditor, the IASB issued IFRIC 19 “Extinguishing 
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Financial Liabilities with Equity Instruments” in 2009. The interpretation offers 
guidance on how to account for transactions like debt-for-equity swaps. 
 The in-class discussion of the debt-for-equity swap should briefly touch 
upon the reasons for the difference between the nominal amount of the loan (€10 
million) and the (credit risk adjusted) fair value (€8 million). Students should 
learn that the deteriorated credit risk situation of TCC induces the bank to accept 
an extinguishment of the liability lower than the original principal amount of the 
loan. Technically speaking, the credit risk adjusted fair value of the loan is less 
than the nominal value due to the bank’s revised cash-flow expectation to not re-
ceive full repayment of the outstanding loan. 
 TCC’s equity increase (e.g. credit equity booking) of €7.9 million is the 
result of subtracting the incremental transaction costs of €0.1 million from the 
fair value of the consideration of €0.8 million. The deduction of the transaction 
costs from equity is required by IAS 32.35 because the costs are directly linked 
and incremental to the issuing of TCC’s additional equity (Ernst & Young 2015). 
The booking entry assumes that the transaction costs are paid directly and there-
fore, the account “cash and cash equivalents” is credited by €0.1 million. 
 IFRIC 19.6 requires that the fair value of the equity instruments should be 
measured first. Only if the measurement of the fair value of the issued equity in-
struments is not reliably possible the fair value of the liability can be used as a 
valuation of the new equity. Due to the pedagogical focus of the case, the fair val-
ue of the new equity instruments is given and no valuation issues (e.g. changes in 
shareholdings) are raised. The provided numbers assume that the fair value of the 
new equity equals the fair value of the liability.  
 This situation is in line with the expected rational behaviour of the devel-
opment bank and the existing shareholders. It can be assumed that both parties 
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only accept fair values in line with IFRS 13 because the measurement of the capi-
tal injection and the extinguishment of the liability is a value that would be seen in 
an “orderly transaction between market participants” (IFRS 13.9). 
Answer: 
A debt-for-equity swap is a common restructuring measure to improve the finan-
cial position of a company. Debt is exchanged for a predetermined amount of eq-
uity. The difference between the carrying amount of the financial liability extin-
guished, and the fair value of the consideration (e.g. the capital injection), shall be 
recognised in profit or loss (IFRIC 19). Incremental costs attributable to an equity 
transaction are debited directly to equity (IAS 32.35). 
[Table 1 about here] 
Debit “Other financial liabilities”  €10 000 
Credit “Share Capital”   €7 900 
Credit “Other income”   €2 000 
Credit “Cash and cash equivalents”  €100  
3.3 Measurement of Financial Instruments   
1) Is Peter right that the fluctuating market values of the bond have to be 
reflected in the income statement? What alternative accounting treatment 
would be possible? 
According to IFRS 9.4.2.1 financial liabilities are measured at amortised cost or 
at fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL). The FVTPL categorization is only 
allowed for instruments that are held for trading, for instruments with embedded 
derivatives, stand-alone derivatives or to avoid an accounting mismatch. 
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 According to IFRS 9 Appendix A, a financial liability has to be classified 
as “held for trading” if the instrument is hold for the purpose of selling 
or repurchasing, is managed within a portfolio to generate short-term 
profit or is a derivative according to IFRS 9. Based on the information 
provided in the case, all of these three held for trading criteria can be re-
jected.  
 Secondly, the FVTPL category has to be used for instruments with em-
bedded derivatives. In accordance with IFRS 9.4.3 an embedded deriva-
tive is a component of a hybrid contract that generates cash-flows like a 
stand-alone derivative. The information provided in the case does not 
lead to the conclusion that the contractual clauses of the participation 
certificate are embedded derivatives.  
 Thirdly, as a matter of fact, the issued bond itself is not a derivative ac-
cording to IFRS 9 Appendix A.  
 Lastly, in accordance with IFRS 9.4.2.2, the FVTPL category can be 
used to avoid an accounting mismatch (between financial liabilities that 
are linked to specific financial assets (Ernst & Young 2015)), or if the 
key management personnel evaluates the performance of the financial li-
ability on a fair value basis. According to the provided information this is 
not the case for TCCs treasury management.  
Therefore, the measurement at amortised cost is the correct way according to 
IFRS 9.4.2.1 and the fair value accounting would be non-compliant with the IFRS 
rules. 
Answer: 
According to IFRS 9, financial liabilities are measured at amortised cost calculat-
ed under the effective interest method except for liabilities measured at “Fair Val-
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ue Through Profit or Loss (FVTPL)”. The FVTPL category includes: Held for 
trading, Derivatives or “Fair Value Options (incl. instruments with embedded de-
rivatives)”. 
Peter’s statement is incorrect, because the bond does not fit into the FVTPL 
category. Therefore, the financial liability from the issuance of the bond has to be 
measured at amortised cost. In conclusion, TCC’s income statement should report 
the corresponding interest income from the application of the effective interest 
method and no gains or losses due to fluctuating fair values of the traded bond.  
2) Due to the zero bond structure of the bond, TCC has to apply the effec-
tive interest method according to IFRS 9.B5.4.1-B5.4.7. Please complete 
the table below assuming that no dividends will be paid by TCC for the 
duration of the bond.  
According to IFRS 9 Appendix A, the amortisation using the effective interest 
method for the zero bond has to be reflected in TCC’s IFRS financial statements. 
The effective interest method recognizes and allocates the interest expenses over 
the life of the financial liability. The allocation of the interest expenses is done by 
discounting the difference between the initial amount and nominal amount with 
the effective interest rate. The calculation of the effective interest rate has to in-
clude the relevant transaction costs (IFRS 9 Appendix A). The transaction costs 
have to be deducted from the financial liability at inception and to be accrued via 
the effective interest method with an effective interest rate of about 7.26 percent: 
1. Step – Calculation of the initial amount 
 Issue amount of €25 million 
 ./. Transaction costs of €0.350 million 
 = Initial amount of €24.65 million 
2. Step – Calculation of the effective interest rate 
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 The general equation based on the compounded interest method: ܰ݋݉�݊�݈ ��݈ݑ =݁ �݊�ݐ��݈ ܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ× ሺͳ + ܧ݂݂݁ܿ�ݐݒ݁ �݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ݁ ܴ�ݐ݁ሻே��௕௘௥ �௙ �௘௔௥௦ 
 Transformed equation to calculate the effective interest rate: 
ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ�ݒ݁ �݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ ܴ�ݐ݁ =  √(ܰ݋݉�݊�݈ ��݈ݑ݁�݊�ݐ��݈ ܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ)���್೐ೝ �೑ �೐ೌೝೞ − ͳ 
 Using the given data in the teaching case: 
ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ�ݒ݁ �݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ ܴ�ݐ݁ =  √(͵ͷ ͲͲͲ ͲͲͲʹͶ ͸ͷͲ ͲͲͲ)5 − ͳ 
 Effective Interest Rate ~ 7.26 % 
The requirement explicitly specifies that no dividend distribution by TCC should 
be assumed and therefore no participation of the profit has to be reflected in the 
calculation of the effective interest rate and the resulting discount. If TCC had 
distributed dividends, the holders of the participation right would have received 
an additional payment. 
Answer: 
[Table 1 about here]] 
3) Calculate the interest coverage ratio for the years 2014 and 2015 as de-
fined in the prospectus in figure 3 of the appendix. Include the EBITDA 
forecasts of figure 2 in your calculations. 
As given in figure 3 of the case appendix, the interest coverage ratio is defined as 
(1) earnings before interests, taxation, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
over (2) net interest expenses of the consolidated financial statements. The inter-
est expenses have to include the interest expenses for the issued bond as calculat-
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ed under 3.2.2 and the interest expenses for the loan from the business develop-
ment bank (€10 million and an annual interest rate of seven percent). 
�݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ ܿ݋ݒ݁ݎ�݃݁ ݎ�ݐ�݋ = ܧܤ�ܶܦܣܮ݋�݊ �݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ + ܤ݋݊݀ �݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ  
Answer: 
[Table 3 about here] 
In both fiscal years, the interest coverage ratio is met, because the ratio is higher 
than the 350 percent required by the business development bank. 
 
4) How does the sales collapse impact the interest coverage ratio? Please 
use the revised income statement from Table 1 for your calculations.  
Answer: 
[Table 4 about here] 
The interest coverage ratio is breached, because the ratio is lower than the 350 
percent required by the business development bank. 
3.4 Disclosure of Financial Instruments 
Because disclosure requirements in general are not at the centre of (un-
der)graduate accounting curriculums (Ruhl and Smith 2013), we consider it use-
ful to give students the following brief overview regarding the scope of the ac-
counting standard IFRS 7 “Disclosure of Financial Instruments”. 
According to IFRS 7.1, the aim of the standard is to provide users of finan-
cial statements with disclosures that enable them to evaluate: 
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 The significance of financial instruments for the entity’s financial posi-
tion and performance; and 
 The nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments, to 
which the entity is exposed during the period and as of the reporting 
date, and how the entity manages those risks. 
The IFRS 7 applies to all entities, including corporates like TCC that have 
few financial instruments and those that have many financial instruments like 
banks or insurance companies. During the in-class discussion, we provided stu-
dents with the following hypothetical user questions that IFRS 7 disclosures tar-
get: 
 What IFRS 9 measurement categorizations are used by the entity? 
 Are there any financial assets and liabilities that are offset against each 
other? 
 Does the company pledge financial assets as collateral? 
 What are the fair values of the at amortized costs categorized instru-
ments?  
 Were there any covenant breaches in the respective reporting period?  
 What are the gains and losses of the IFRS 9 categories? 
 What credit risk, liquidity risk or market risk exposure faces the entity 
due to the financial instruments? 
3) Why is Thomas pressuring to close the debt-for-equity swap before the 
end of the fiscal year? What disclosures would otherwise be needed ac-
cording to IFRS 7.19? 
The board of the IASB concluded that disclosures of defaults and breaches of loan 
payables (e.g. bank loans, bonds) are relevant information for users about the 
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entity’s creditworthiness and its prospects of obtaining future loans 
(IFRS 7.BC32). This particular reasoning is exactly the kind of information that 
TCC tries to hide by executing the debt-for-equity swap and therefore, avoiding 
the potential negative capital market effects of such a disclosure. 
 Although the teaching case and the requirements do not deal with IAS 1 
“Presentation of Financial Statements”, we encourage lecturers to briefly explain 
that, according to IAS 1.60, prepares of IFRS statements are required to disclose 
whether a liability is current, i.e. a maturity within the next twelve months after 
the reporting date, or non-current, i.e. a maturity beyond the next twelve months 
after the reporting date. Due to the covenants breach and the imminent loan re-
payment, TCC would have been required to reclassify the loan as a current liabil-
ity indicating that a repayment of the loan would be required within the next 
twelve months. 
 
Answer: 
Thomas is aware of the IFRS 7.19 requirement to disclose the carrying amount of 
loans when breaches of the loan agreement terms occurred during the reporting 
period (unless the breaches were remedied on or before the reporting period). The 
debt-for-equity swap leads to the extinguishment of the respective financial liabil-
ity (the bank loan) and consequently, the IFRS 7 disclosure is not necessary, be-
cause the standard only requires this disclosure for financial liabilities that are on 
the balance sheet at the reporting date. 
An example of such a disclosure would be: “As of 31 December 2014, TCC 
was in breach of its borrowing covenants with respect to a banking loan with a 
carrying amount of €10 million. As a result, the amount was reclassified as a cur-
rent liability reflecting the right of the lender to call these funds immediately”. 
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4) What year-end fair value disclosure would be necessary for the loan 
according to IFRS 7.25? 
The requirement introduces to the students the concept of IFRS 7 to disclose fair 
values according to IFRS 13 “Fair Value Measurement”, despite the fact that the 
respective financial instruments are measured on the balance sheet at amortized 
costs. The IASB argues in IFRS 7.BC36 that fair values are “[…] relevant to 
many decisions made by users of financial statements because, in many circum-
stances, it reflects the judgement of the financial markets about the present value 
of expected future cash flows relating to an instrument. […]”. Therefore, 
IFRS 7.25 requires disclosing fair values for financial assets or liabilities not 
measured on a fair value basis according to IFRS 9 “Financial Instruments”. 
Students should be reminded that the financial statement category “other finan-
cial liabilities” is measured at amortized costs and are therefore, reported with 
their carrying amount.  
 During the in-class discussion, we drew students’ attention to the significant 
difference of €2 million between the carrying and fair value amount of the loan 
that TCC would be required to disclose. As already discussed under A.5, due to 
the deteriorated business outlook for TCC, it can be assumed that the difference is 
mainly caused by the increased credit risk that the loan represents for the devel-
opment bank. The decreased likelihood of full repayment of the loan is reflected in 
the calculation of the fair value. Through this kind of financial disclosure, TCC 
would be forced to report the judgment of the capital providers about its overall 
financial situation. 
 The lecturer should stress that fair values need not be given for instruments 
for which the carrying amount reasonably approximates their fair values, for ex-
ample short-term trade receivables and payables (IFRS 7.29(a)). If the fair values 
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for financial instruments cannot be reliably measured according to IFRS 13, the 
entity has to provide information that assists users in making their own judgments 
about possible differences between the carrying and fair value amount 
(IFRS 7.30; Ernst & Young 2015). 
Answer: 
IFRS 7.25 explicitly requires reporting the fair value of each class of financial 
liability in a way that permits comparison with the corresponding carrying 
amounts. One possible way for TCC to meet the requirements would be the fol-
lowing table: 
[Table 5 about here] 
3.5 Related Corporate Finance Issues 
In order to improve the learning outcome of the teaching case, we drafted accom-
panying corporate finance related requirements. The corporate finance issues ask 
the students to reflect upon the classification of the financial instrument. Although 
the main learning objectives of the teaching case are centred on accounting is-
sues, the in-class discussion showed that the understanding of the accounting-
related learning objectives was significantly improved by placing the accounting 
technicalities in a corporate finance context.30  
 Despite the fact that the corporate finance related questions are presented 
as the last ones, the lecturer might consider it useful to start the in-class discus-
sion of the teaching-case with the related corporate finance issues precisely to 
illustrate the students the economic consequences of equity-vs-debt decisions.  
Derived from a neoclassical inspired theory it can be argued that the mix of the 
                                               
30
  Please see section “Student Assessment” in the implementation guidance for further details. 
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entity’s capital structure does not matter in perfect capital markets and the ques-
tion of whether to issue equity or debt is not worthwhile being considered.  
 However, as the practical realities reveal, the classification of financial 
instruments as equity or debt does matter and therefore, the accounting treatment 
of an issued security has an impact on the market value of the entity (Myres 
2001). In order to ensure that students grasp the importance of the equity-vs-debt 
discussion, we introduced the basic concepts of the Modigliani / Miller theory, the 
trade-off theory and the signalling effects of corporate finance measures. Based 
on our experience, advanced undergraduate students and graduate students 
should be familiar with the presented corporate finance issues due to specific cor-
porate finance courses in the curriculum. Therefore, the solutions and the re-
quirements are solely targeted to refresh students’ understanding of capital struc-
ture questions and the economic consequences of corporate finance measures. If 
the lecturer wants to present more details we refer to standard corporate finance 
textbooks.31 
1) What is the optimal leverage ratio for TCC according to the Modigliani 
and Miller proposition I?  
Answer: 
According to the Modigliani and Miller proposition I, the market value of a com-
pany is not affected by its capital structure (Modigliani and Miller 1958). Within 
the framework, it is argued that the value of the company is entirely derived from 
the cash-flows that are generated by the total assets of the company (“the left hand 
side of the balance sheet”). Decisions regarding the funding structure (“the right 
hand side of the balance sheet”) do not have any impact on the firm value.  
                                               
31
  See for example Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2007) as a comprehensive teaching book to dis-
cuss these capital structure issues in more detail. 
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Therefore, assuming that the equity from TCC’s shareholders is limited, 
TCC’s optimal capital position would be funded with a maximum of debt because 
TCC’s existing shareholders would have no incentive at all to finance TCC’s 
strategy with (additional) equity. Conversely, it would be not in the (rational) in-
terest of the existing shareholders to dilute the decision making power of the cur-
rent shareholders with new shareholders. 
But: The irrelevance theorem of the capital structure is based on the assump-
tion of the efficient market. 
2) Please challenge your conclusion from D.1 with the trade-off theory.  
Answer: 
The irrelevance theory of the capital structure (Modigliani Miller proposition I) 
excludes the benefits of the “debt tax shield” and ignores “financial distress 
costs”. However, both of these aspects have to be considered by TCC’s manage-
ment in finding the optimal capital structure. Therefore the optimal funding struc-
ture, i.e. the structure with the maximum firm market value, is determined by the 
costs and benefits of debt. Figure 1 illustrates this point with the maximum of the 
red line (the value of the levered firm). The maximum point of the value of the 
levered firm indicates the pivot point of the benefits of leverage because at this 
point the marginal financial distress costs are higher than the marginal tax shield 
benefits for additional leverage. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, a company balances 
the value of the tax benefit from deductibility of interest with the present value of 
the costs of financial distress. 
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The “debt tax shield” is the additional value of the firm that stems from the 
deduction of interest expenses (e. g. from issued debt) from the taxable income of 
the company. Ceteris paribus, the higher the interest expenses for a given profit, 
the lower the taxes the company has to pay. Because tax payments can be inter-
preted as costs that lower the firm value, the higher leverage (with a lower tax 
take) has a positive impact on the firm value (see Graham 2000). 
But, increasing the leverage of a corporation raises the bankruptcy costs in 
the event of financial distress. Direct bankruptcy costs like legal or administration 
fees occur when the company defaults and creditors have to go to court to get a 
least part of the borrowed money back. In addition, there are indirect bankruptcy 
costs like avoiding a bankruptcy filing (see Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, and Bradford 
2007). A typical example of indirect cost is a supplier who abandons a customer 
due to the prospect of losing a financial claim during bankruptcy procedures. 
3) What kind of signals can equity issuances convey to the capital market? 
Please discuss your answer within the pecking order theory. 
Answer: 
The pecking order theory introduces asymmetric information to the question of 
the optimal capital structure. In contrast to the firm’s management, the capital 
market has limited knowledge about the financial prospect of the firm. The theory 
states that rational management uses internal financing when available and choos-
es debt over equity when external financing is required. This prioritization of 
funding sources is the “pecking order” and reflects the firm’s management fund-
ing decision in connection with the expected risk and reward profile of investment 
projects (Myers 1984). 
Based on the pecking order theory, firms that announce equity issuances 
have therefore no internal funding available and no access to debt or believe that 
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the share price is too high. Obviously, all characteristics can be interpreted as sig-
nals to the capital market that the financial outlook of the company requires fur-
ther assessment. 
4) Which corporate finance measure does TCC use to resolve the capital 
structure issue? Which of the above capital structure theories best ex-
plains TCC financial restructuring decision? 
Answer: 
TCC renegotiates the terms of the outstanding loan from the development bank 
and issues its own equity instruments to the bank to fully repay the loan. The debt-
for-equity swap is a common measure to improve the capital structure within fi-
nancial restructuring (Weston et al. 2004). 
 TCC’s finance function weighs up the costs (e.g. the negative capital market 
reactions due to the covenant breach) and benefits of the outstanding loan (e.g. the 
potential tax benefits of the loan) and comes to the conclusion that the issuance of 
additional shares to repay the loan is the best way to solve TCC’s capital structure 
issue under the specific circumstances. Due to the specific consideration of finan-
cial distress costs (e.g. the potential covenant breach as a first step towards a fi-
nancial distress situation) the trade-off theory best explains TCC’s corporate fi-
nance measures. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Booking entries for the debt-for-equity swap 
in 000 € As of July 2014 Accounting Treatment 
Book Value Loan  10 000 Carrying Amount (IFRIC 19.9) 
Fair Value Loan  8 000 
Fair Value of the 
Consideration 
(IFRIC 19.9) 
Advisory Fees 100 
Incremental Transac-
tion Costs  
(IAS 32.35) 
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Table 2. Effective interest method calculation 
Fiscal  
Year 
 
Opening Balance  
in € 
 
Interest Expenses  
in € 
 
Closing Balance  
in € 
 
2014 
(Initial Amount) 
24 650 000.00 
(Opening Balance * Ef-
fective Interest Rate) 
1 790 346.83 
(Opening balance + 
Interest Expenses) 
26 440 346.83 
2015 26 440 346.83 1 920 380.98 28 360 727.82 
2016 28 360 727.82 2 059 859.60 30 420 587.42 
2017 30 420 587.42 2 209 468.66 32 630 056.08 
2018 32 630 056.08 2 369 943.92 
(Nominal Amount) 
35 000 000.00 
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Table 3. Interest coverage ratio calculation I 
in € 2014e 2015e 
EBITDA 10 058 000.00 11 678 000.00 
Loan Interest      700 000.00      700 000.00 
Bond Interest  1 790 346.83  1 920 380.98 
Interest Coverage 
Ratio 403.88% 445.66% 
 
 
Table 4. Interest coverage ratio calculation II 
in € 2014e 
EBITDA 7 328 000.00 
Loan Interest 700 000.00 
Bond Interest 1 790 346.83 
Interest Coverage Ratio 294.25% 
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Table 5. IFRS 7 Fair value disclosure 
IFRS 9 Financial Liabil-
ity Classification 
Carrying Amount 
 
Fair Value Amount 
 
“Other Financial Liabili-
ties” €10 million €8 million 
 
 
Figure 1. Impact of leverage on the market value of the firm 
 
Source: Brealey et al. (2007) 
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DETERMINANTS OF CONSISTENT CAPITAL MARKET 
COMMUNICATION: EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the level of consistency in using financial key performance 
indicators (KPIs) in capital market communication in Germany and examines spe-
cific determinants of consistent KPI reporting. To measure such consistency, the 
study reports three consistency indices that were uniquely developed for this pa-
per. The indices measure the consistent KPI reporting of a sample of German 
listed companies from 2009 to 2014 and consist of up to 396 firm year observa-
tions. These indices indicate a high level of inconsistency in the reporting behav-
iour of German companies in the management report, the annual report and capital 
market communication. The results range from 36% to 48% consistency, indicat-
ing room for improvement. The results of a random effects regression analysis 
report for all indices that the level of consistency increased significantly in 2013 
and 2014. The study shows that profitable firms and firms with an above average 
number of KPIs report more consistently than other firms. This paper contributes 
to the literature on disclosure topics in accounting by introducing KPI consistency 
indices as a proxy of disclosure quality and demonstrates that the KPI reporting 
behaviour of German firms lacks consistency. 
 
Keywords:  Disclosure; Consistency; Key performance indicators; Germany  
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1 Introduction 
The development and determinants of financial disclosure are the gist of numer-
ous discussions between and within academia, standard setting bodies and practi-
tioners. A core topic of the ongoing discussion is the need for an internationally 
harmonised management report as a crucial component of capital market commu-
nication (IASB, 2005) to ease the classical principal-agent problem (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). On national level in Germany, management reports have a long 
tradition as the narrative part of financial reporting in which management gives an 
overview of a firm’s current and expected financial performance. A management 
report acts as a reference book for all capital market communication, because it 
gives investors information about the firm’s structure, its business strategy and 
internal performance indicators. The importance of management reports as part of 
capital market communication is underpinned by empirical studies that provide 
evidence on the decision usefulness of a firm’s strategy section and management’s 
forward-looking statements (e.g. Sieber et al., 2014; Oberdoerster, 2009). Unlike 
consolidated financial statements, the preparation of management reports is not 
globally harmonised. Responding to the divergence in respect of the quality and 
quantity of management reports, the IASB in London published its “Practice 
statement: Management commentary” (PS) in 2010 (IASB, 2010). The PS sets out 
non-binding guidelines for the presentation of decision useful information in man-
agement reports. In particular, the PS requires that the presented information has 
to be consistent with, complement and supplement financial information. Key 
performance indicators (KPIs) as “factors by reference to which the development, 
performance or position of the business of the company can be measured effec-
tively” (UK Companies Act, 2006) should form the basis of the discussion in the 
PS and have attracted even earlier than that attention from regulation bodies. For 
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example, in 2004 the European Commission published a directive for European 
companies to disclose additional and more detailed information on KPIs that man-
agement uses to steer companies. The additional information on KPIs should al-
low the users of financial information to better understand the performance and 
development of the company. In 2012, a new German Accounting Standard 
(GAS) was published to specify amongst other things KPI disclosures. In 2015, 
the German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP)1 put the consistent 
use of KPIs on its audit agenda (FREP, 2014). Although KPIs feature in most fi-
nancial disclosures, attract increased attention from regulators and their usefulness 
is not disputed, there is limited research on the quality of KPI reporting (Elzahar 
et al., 2015). 
To contribute to the research on financial disclosure in general and the further 
development of harmonised financial KPI reporting guidelines, we investigate the 
consistent use of financial KPIs in management reports as well as in consolidated 
financial statements and in investor relations presentations for year-end earning 
calls. We calculate three uniquely constructed disclosure indices to analyse the 
consistent use of financial KPIs in capital market communication of German 
companies spanning the period from 2009 to 2014. We broadly define capital 
market communication as financial disclosures covering the management report, 
the consolidated financial statements and the investor relations presentations for 
year-end earning calls. 
                                               
1
 FREP has been examining financial reporting of companies listed in the regulated 
market in Germany since July 2005. Enforcement of financial reporting is per-
formed in Germany in two stages; the first stage involves the government-
appointed privately organised institution FREP, with the Enforcement Panel as its 
active body, while the second stage is performed by the Federal Financial Supervi-
sory Authority (“Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht” – BaFin), which 
has sovereign authority (http://www.frep.info/index_en.php). 
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We identify a low level of consistency (36% to 48%, depending on time period 
and index). There is a low level of consistency in all three elements of capital 
market communication. The inconsistency cannot be solely explained by different 
KPI definitions in the different elements of capital market communication. We are 
able to show that the level of consistency improved from 2009 to 2014. Our re-
gression results indicate that since the application of an improved GAS on man-
agement reporting in 2013, the level of KPI disclosure consistency has increased 
significantly. We also find evidence that companies with a high number of finan-
cial KPIs and therefore a high level of reporting complexity achieve higher con-
sistency than companies with fewer than the average number of financial KPIs. In 
line with other empirical studies, we find support for the hypothesis that profitable 
companies on average report higher quality information (e.g. Akhtaruddin, 2005; 
Hossain & Mitra, 2004; Karim, 1996). 
Our results show that accounting regulation is capable of improving reporting 
consistency through better accounting guidelines and standards. In addition, we 
show that firms of any size or reporting complexity are able to disclose consistent 
capital market information. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the regu-
latory framework of KPI reporting in Germany. Section 3 discusses the relevant 
literature and the development of the hypotheses. The research design with the 
underlying panel data, the construction of the consistency indices and the regres-
sion model are introduced in section 4. Section 5 presents the regression results 
and the analysis. The paper concludes with a discussion and possible future re-
search avenues. 
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2 Regulatory Framework for KPI Disclosure 
According to German Commercial Code (HGB), capital market orientated firms 
in Germany have to disclose their management report to complement the consoli-
dated financial statements in the annual report. The management report is part of 
the financial audit and further examined by FREP. Although the management re-
port as an integral part of the annual report has a long tradition in Germany2, the 
legal requirement for capital market orientated companies to prepare and disclose 
the management report only came into effect through the EWG directives 78/660 
and 83/349 in 1985. As a result, the German legislator implemented HGB para-
graph 315 that requires firms to provide users with information on the course of 
their business, the financial position and the expected development. The para-
graph 315 requests that the discussion in the management report should be based 
on the main financial KPIs that are used in the internal management system.  
Due to the increasing importance of KPIs in capital market communication, the 
EG directive 2003/51 in 2004 introduced the requirement to disclose the financial 
KPIs of internal management systems for European firms. In the same year, the 
Accounting Standards Committee of Germany (ASCG) issued the GAS 15 
“Group Management Report”. GAS 15 formulated specific recommendations re-
garding the information a management report should include according to HGB 
paragraph 315. Among other aspects, GAS 15 clarified that the management has 
to disclose the financial KPIs of the internal management system and that the 
management report should follow the business segment structure according to the 
consolidated financial statements.  
                                               
2
 Bayer AG complemented the financial statements for 1883/84 with a management 
report that discussed, among other aspects, fluctuating commodity prices and the 
acquisition of patents (Fink et al., 2013). 
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In 2012, the ASCG issued the GAS 20 “Group Management Report”, which must 
have been applied for the first time in 2013 and superseded GAS 15. GAS 20 in-
tended to combine in a user-friendly manner the accounting standards governing 
group management reporting that have evolved over time (GAS 5 Risk Reporting, 
GAS 5–10 Risk Reporting by Financial Institutions and Financial Service Institu-
tions and GAS 5–20 Risk Reporting by Insurance Entities, as well as GAS 15 
Management Reporting) into a single accounting standard (Kajüter et al. 2010). In 
addition the existing guidance was streamlined and GAS 20 gives more detailed 
guidance on how firms have to use financial KPIs for the business review section 
(GAS 20.101) as well as the provided outlook (GAS 20.126). All these additional 
guidelines can be interpreted as clarifications and not as basic changes to the KPI 
reporting requirements. GAS 20 also introduced a vague definition of a key per-
formance indicator: “A measure that is used to assess an aspect of an entity’s per-
formance. It can be qualitative or quantitative.” 
According to EU Regulation 1606/2002, German capital market orientated firms 
have to prepare their consolidated financial statements according to IFRS. In par-
ticular, firms have to disclose business segments with additional disclosures as 
part of the consolidated financial statements. Business segment reporting is regu-
lated by IFRS 8 “Operating segments” and aims to enable users of financial 
statements to evaluate the nature and financial effects of the firm (IFRS 8.20). In 
particular, IFRS 8.23 requires firms to disclose measures the management uses to 
assess the segment performance and to allocate resources. If firms use more than 
one measure, they may limit the disclosure to the performance measure that is 
most consistent with the entity’s financial statements (IFRS 8.26). Apparently, the 
performance measure definition according to IFRS 8 and the KPI definition ac-
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cording to GAS 20 are not identical. But because both definitions are based on the 
performance measures or indicators used to manage the entity (management ap-
proach), the KPIs according to IFRS 8 and GAS 20 should be identical. 
In addition to the mandatory parts of financial reporting, such as management 
reports and consolidated financial reports, firms are increasingly using voluntary 
disclosures to cater for the specific needs of the capital market. In particular, firms 
regularly use extensive presentations about the financial performance in year-end 
earning calls. In these calls, the management discusses the most recent business 
performance (e.g. year-end financial results according to the annual report) with 
financial analysts (Bragg, 2014). These investor relations presentations are volun-
tary and the content of the presented slides is not regulated. Nevertheless, it can be 
assumed that the management bases its performance discussion on the KPIs that 
are also used in the internal management system. 
To summarise, consistent capital market communication that covers mandatory as 
well as voluntary elements should be based on identical financial KPIs, because 
all disclosure elements refer directly or indirectly to the KPIs management uses 
for internal control purposes. 
3 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Several empirical studies have investigated the determinants of disclosure quality 
(e.g. Cooke, 1989; Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). In one way 
or another, all these studies analyse the influence of specific factors on the disclo-
sure quality of firms. The studies use different disclosure indices. Disclosure qual-
ity is usually measured by weighted or unweighted scores for voluntary or manda-
tory disclosure items in annual reports. Due to the importance of financial disclo-
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sure to bridge information asymmetry as part of the principal agent problem (Jen-
sen & Meckling, 1976), disclosure determinant analysis has been identified as an 
important accounting research area (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999).  
Prior studies have identified explanatory factors such as size, complexity, profita-
bility, ownership structure and financial leverage for disclosure behaviour. De-
spite the importance of financial KPIs for capital market communication (cover-
ing the mandatory annual report and voluntary investor relations activities), the 
determinants of KPI disclosure quality have received limited attention from re-
searchers. Elzahar et al. (2015) investigates KPI disclosure quality in annual re-
ports for a sample of UK listed companies for the period 2006 to 2010. To our 
knowledge, there are no studies that measure the consistent use of financial KPIs 
in capital market communication and that investigate the firm characteristics of 
consistent KPI reporting. 
3.1 Size 
In several prior studies, firm size was identified as a significant explanatory factor 
for the level of disclosure quality (Cooke, 1989; Hossain & Mitra, 2004; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Larger firms can spend more resources on 
disclosure than smaller ones. Previous studies also found that large companies 
tend to disclose more information in order to increase investor confidence and to 
decrease agency cost, which is higher than for smaller firms (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Watts & Zimmermann, 1990; Marston & Polei, 2004). Consistent with prior 
research (Cooke, 1989, 1992; Wallace et al., 1994; Apostolos, 2000) we presume 
that there is a significant link between firm size and consistency of capital market 
communication. According to Cooke (1992), there “is no overwhelming theoreti-
cal reason to prefer one size variable to another”. In prior studies, firm size was 
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measured by various indicators, such as sales (Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989), total 
assets (Hossain & Mitra, 2004), capital employed (Akhtaruddin, 2005) or market 
value (Karim, 1996). We follow Hossain and Mitra (2004) to use total assets as 
proxy, due to the significant results of the relevant study. 
H1: Consistency of disclosure information is positively associated with the size of 
a company.  
3.2 Complexity of Firm and of Financial Reporting 
We focus on two dimensions of complexity for companies to disclose financial 
information: the complexity of the firm and the complexity of financial reporting. 
Firstly, we assume that companies with an above average number of business 
segments tend to report financial KPIs less consistently, due to the high amount of 
segment information and the complexity the number of segments cause for capital 
market communication. This complexity stems from the increased likelihood that 
the business segments have conflicting operational procedures or reporting ap-
proaches (e.g. Bushman, et al. 2004). Although Cooke (1989) argues that firms 
with a high level of complexity are required to disclose more information to meet 
the information demand of capital market actors, we assume that higher complexi-
ty makes it more difficult to report consistently. We proxy firm complexity with 
the ratio of the number of business segments of the relevant firm to the average 
number of business segments of the analysed data panel.  
Secondly, the argument underlying our complexity of firm hypothesis is also the 
basis of our argument to assume that the more KPIs a company uses in its finan-
cial reporting, the more difficult it becomes to report consistently on these indica-
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tors throughout capital market communication. The number of KPIs to the aver-
age number of KPIs in the relevant panel is tested as an independent variable. 
H2: Companies with higher business complexity disclose KPI information more 
inconsistently. 
H3: Companies with above average KPIs in their financial reporting disclose 
KPIs less consistently in this financial reporting. 
3.3 Profitability 
Prior research has examined profitability as a significant indicator of disclosure 
quality (Akhtaruddin, 2005; Hossain & Mitra, 2004; Karim 1996, Owusu-Ansah, 
1998, Wallace & Nasar, 1995, Wallace et.al., 1994). Wallace et al. (1994), 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Hossain and Mitra (2004) find that more profitable 
firms disclose more information in their corporate reports than less profitable 
companies. It is argued that especially profitable companies tend to demonstrate 
their good performance and the value of their investment to their investors (Soli-
man, 2013) in order to justify management salaries (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Princi-
pals as managers are also interested in creating a positive impact on the entity 
valuation to avoid a hostile takeover. The ratio of net income to total equity is 
employed as an independent variable. 
H4: The better the firm’s profitability, the more consistent the corporate disclo-
sure. 
3.4 Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure of a company tends to be an important variable for the 
behaviour of corporate disclosure and therefore for the consistency of disclosed 
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information. The relationship between insiders (e.g. managers or block owners) on 
the one side and external stakeholders (e.g. small investors, analysts and the pub-
lic) on the other side is characterised by the agency problem, which assumes a 
persistent information gap between these two groups. Corporate insiders have 
multiple channels to obtain value-relevant information and can assess corporate 
items with non-public information (Bassen et al., 2010; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Companies with investors who own a large stake of the company’s share 
capital usually face smaller agency problems (Archambault & Archambault, 
2003). Companies with a relatively high free float of shares tend to disclose more 
information in order to inform all owners comprehensively as part of good corpo-
rate governance and to ease the agency cost (Leftwich et al., 1981; McKinnon & 
Dalimunthe, 1993; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Consequently, we use the percentage 
of the free float of shares as a proxy for the ownership structure. 
H5: Companies with a diffused ownership structure disclose information more 
consistently. 
3.5 Financial Leverage 
Previous studies present conflicting results about the impact of financial leverage 
on disclosure quality. Wallace et al. (1994) and Chow & Wong-Boren (1987) find 
that financial leverage has no effect on disclosure, whereas Zarzeski (1996), 
Archambault & Archambault (2003) and Meek et al. (1995) figure out that disclo-
sure quality decreases with high leverage. These conflicting empirical findings are 
interesting, because derived from the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
companies with a high proportion of external funding are more inclined to bridge 
the information asymmetry with high quality and consistent capital market disclo-
sure. In order to investigate the role of financial leverage on consistent financial 
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KPI reporting, we employ the ratio of total debt to total equity as an independent 
variable. 
H5: Companies with a high financial leverage report financial KPIs more con-
sistently. 
3.6 Stock Market Index 
Companies that are listed on the German DAX30 or MDAX have to meet numer-
ous listing regulations and disclosure requirements. That is why index listed com-
panies are more likely to have a higher level of disclosure quality (Cooke, 1989; 
Wallace et al., 1994; Choi, 1973). Following Cooke (1989), companies on major 
indices are better covered by equity analysts than other companies. As a result, 
they are asked to disclose more useful decision-making information and pay more 
attention to disclosure quality. Derived from these theoretical and empirical re-
sults, we construct the hypothesis that a higher listing status of a company is 
linked to more consistent disclosure of information. 
H7: DAX30 listed companies disclose more consistent information than compa-
nies that are listed on the MDAX and are not index listed, respectively. 
3.7 Industry 
Previous research hypothesises that the disclosure level varies between different 
industries (Akhtarrudin, 2005), due to different regulation policies, the nature of 
the work, politically sensitive requirements, such as oil and gas, complexity or 
specific industrial characteristics (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Cooke, 1992). Cooke 
(1989) finds that manufacturing companies disclose more information than com-
panies in other industries and assumes that distinct characteristics of industries 
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might result in different levels of disclosure in corporate annual reports. Haniffa & 
Cooke (2002) find a similar result for construction companies and firms in the 
trading industry. However, Owusu-Ansah (1998) finds no evidence for disclosure 
influence by industries. Due to these inconclusive empirical findings and the lack 
of a compelling theory regarding industry-specific disclosure behaviour, we do 
not expect a significant relationship between industry membership and the level of 
consistency in capital market communication. 
H8: There is no significant relationship between industry type and consistency of 
KPI reporting. 
3.8 Reporting Period 
A number of previous studies have empirically supported the argument that dis-
closure quality improves over time, because preparers, users, auditors and enforc-
ers gain experience in the application of new accounting standards and guidelines 
(Nelson, 2003; Callao & Jarne, 2010; Salewski et al., 2014). Due to European 
directives and improved application guidelines of KPI reporting in the recent past, 
we expect a similar improvement for KPI reporting quality in terms of consisten-
cy. In particular, we hypothesise that the application of the GAS 20 “Group Man-
agement Report” as of 2013 led to a significant improvement. This argument is 
supported by FREP putting the consistency requirement for KPIs on its audit 
agenda for financial statements in 2014. 
H8: KPI reporting consistency has improved significantly since 2013. 
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4 Research design 
4.1 Panel Data Sample 
The study covers the composition of the German stock market indices DAX30 
and MDAX in December 2014. The 80 companies listed in the two indices repre-
sent the biggest stock market listed companies in Germany. The data panel in-
cludes the fiscal years from 2009 to 2014. We start our investigation with the fis-
cal year 2009 in order to avoid the influence of a regulatory change caused by the 
underlying segmenting reporting of the analysed companies, because the applica-
tion of IFRS 8 “Operating segments” was obligatory with the fiscal year 2009.  
Following other studies (e.g. Akhtaruddin, 2005; Inchausti, 1997), we exclude 
banks and insurance companies due to industry-specific balance sheet characteris-
tics. We also exclude companies that are not based in Germany, because they are 
not required to prepare and disclose management reports according to HGB. Due 
to the lack of investor relations presentations for a few firms, we must have two 
data panels. Because of better data availability for disclosed annual reports (AR), 
the AR panel comprises 66 firms in comparison to the capital market communica-
tion (CMC) data sample, with 33 firms. Table 1 provides more details. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The different composition of firms leads to a varied industry distribution in the 
samples (e.g. manufacturing firms in AR sample 60,61% vs. CMC sample 
66,67%) and to a noteworthy difference in terms of stock market index member-
ship: DAX30 members represent 39,39% of the AR sample and 51,52% of the 
CMC sample.  
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[Table 2 about here] 
4.2 Construction of the Disclosure Indices 
Although several disclosure indices are used as a proxy to measure disclosure 
quality and quantity (e.g. Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Cooke, 1989; Mars-
ton, 1991), we are not aware of an index that assesses the consistent use of finan-
cial KPIs in corporate financial disclosures. We therefore developed three unique 
item-based disclosure indices to analyse the consistency of capital market com-
munication: Consistency index for management report (CIMR); Consistency index 
for annual report (CIAR); Consistency index for capital market communication 
(CICMC). The indices of this study are built on each other: the CIMR covers the 
management report according to HGB and the CIAR measures the consistency of 
the annual report, including the CIMR and the KPI reporting of the segment report-
ing according to IFRS 8 of the consolidated financial statements. The CICMC co-
vers the annual report, including the management report and segment reporting, 
plus the investor relations presentations for year-end earning calls. 
We adopt an item-based dichotomous approach in which the item scores 1 if the 
KPI is used in the specific part of the disclosure, and 0 otherwise. Our index con-
struction follows the stream of literature that uses unweighted items (e.g. Ahmed 
& Nicholls, 1994; Cook, 1989; Wallace et al., 1994), which means all items of the 
different disclosure sections are equally important. If an entity uses more than one 
KPI, the average consistency index for the firm year is used. To capture the im-
portance of segment information (Blanco et al., 2015), we require the use of KPIs 
on a segment level and count the information accordingly. The determination of 
the consistency index can be summarised as follows: 
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�࢕࢔࢙࢏࢙࢚ࢋ࢔ࢉ࢟ ࢏࢔ࢊࢋ࢞ =  �࢑,࢐ =  ∑ ࢊ࢏,࢑,࢐࢏࢔,࢑,࢐࢏=࢏�,࢑࢐�࢑,࢐ =  ∑ ࢊ࢏,࢑,࢐࢏࢔,࢑,࢐࢏=࢏�,࢑࢐  
Where: 
T = total number of consistent uses of financial KPI (݀_�, 0 ≤� ≤݊) 
M = maximum number of applicable financial KPI uses (݀_�, 0 ≤� ≤݉, ݉ ≥݊) 
k = financial KPI 
j = firm  
In a first step, we identify the main financial KPIs according to the internal man-
agement systems section in the firm’s management report. Then we count the use 
of these KPIs on a segment level in the business review, the outlook, the segment 
reporting and the investor relations presentations. If the firm declared in the inter-
nal management section that the relevant KPI is only used on group level, we re-
quire the use only on group level in the applicable sections (group KPIs are not 
reported in the segment reporting section). Appendix 1 contains examples of how 
we compute the three consistency indices for the management report, the annual 
report and the capital market communication. 
4.3 Panel Model Development 
We constructed the following models to test our hypotheses. 
ܥ�ெ� = α + �ଵܶܣ + �ଶܨܥ + �ଷܴܥ + �ସܴܲ + �ହܱܵ + �଺ܨܮ + �଻�ܦ + �଼�ܰ+ �ଽܨ� 
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ܥ��� = α + �ଵܶܣ + �ଶܨܥ + �ଷܴܥ + �ସܴܲ + �ହܱܵ + �଺ܨܮ + �଻�ܦ + �଼�ܰ+ �ଽܨ� 
ܥ��ெ�  = α + �ଵܶܣ + �ଶܨܥ + �ଷܴܥ + �ସܴܲ + �ହܱܵ + �଺ܨܮ + �଻�ܦ + �଼�ܰ+ �ଽܨ� 
Where: CIMR = Consistency index for management report; CIAR = Consistency 
index for annual report; CICMC = Consistency index for capital market communi-
cation; TA = Total assets; FC = Firm complexity; RC = Reporting complexity; PR 
= Profitability; OS = Ownership structure; FL = Financial leverage; ID = Dummy 
variables for DAX30 listing, MDAX listing or No index listing; IN = Dummy 
variables for industries (manufacturing, services or other); FY = Dummy variables 
for fiscal years from 2009 to 2014. The variables are defined in Appendix 2. 
The models with the dependent variables CIMR and CIAR are analysed with the data 
panel AM because the sample consists of all companies in which we were able to 
examine the management report and the consolidated financial statements in the 
annual report. To analyse the determinants of the CICMC, we use the data panel 
CMC, for which we are able to acquire the corresponding investor relations 
presentations. 
In line with other studies (e.g. Yekini et al., 2015), we analyse the panel data by 
using the random effects estimator with generalised least square (GLS). The per-
formance of the Breusch-Pagan test for all three models reveals unobserved heter-
ogeneity in our data samples, which can be solved by using the fixed effects (FE) 
or random effects (RE) models (Breusch & Pagan, 1980). In order to decide 
whether the FE or RE is the best statistical approach, we performed the Hausmann 
test. The test produces results with a significance at a 1% level in favour of the RE 
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estimator for all three models. We also analyse the data with robust standard er-
rors to adjust all standard errors and p-values for heteroscedasticity. 
5 Results and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the consistency indices in Table 3 show a high level 
of inconsistency in financial KPI reporting concerning all three analysed parts of 
capital market communication. The average consistency in the period 2009 to 
2014 was 46% for CIMR, 50% for CIAR and 50% for CICMC. Broadly speaking, the 
companies discussed and reported the KPIs only in 46% or 50% of cases in which 
the discussion and reporting would have been appropriated. The index scores for 
the entire period varied significantly from 0,00 to 1,00, which means that compa-
nies sometimes do not use the supposed significant financial KPIs in corporate 
financial disclosures at all (index score 0) or the use of the financial KPIs occurs 
in all possible instances in the financial communication (index score 1). We find 
evidence that the consistency in capital market communication and the annual 
report is higher than in the management report, the equal level of consistency in 
the annual report and capital market communication with 50% is noteworthy. The 
details of the time series for all three indices indicate a constant positive develop-
ment over time. The analysis shows average indices of 36% for CIMR, 39% for 
CIAR and 38% for CICMC in 2009, and 60% for CIMR, 64% for CIAR and 62% for 
CICMC in 2014. The consistent improvement over time is in line with our hypothe-
sis 3.8 and will be statistically analysed in section 5.3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
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Table 4 reports the data for the independent values for the AR panel as well as the 
CMC panel. The total assets as a proxy for Size indicate that the companies ana-
lysed in our CMC panel are larger than those analysed in our AR panel (mean log 
of total assets of 16,45 against 16,07). This observation is in line with research 
findings that bigger companies volunteer more information than smaller ones 
(Cooke, 1989), because the firms in the CMC panel on average share more data 
through investor relations presentations.  
The two average complexity measures Firm complexity and Reporting complexity 
are reported as one. This is mathematically required, because both measures com-
pare the actual number of business segments (Firm complexity) or KPIs (Report-
ing complexity) respective to the average number of these measures in the appli-
cable data panels. The average Profitability as the net income in relation to share-
holders’ capital is 12% on average for both panels. The percentage of free-floating 
shares as a proxy for Ownership structure is 76% for the CMC panel, which is 
higher than the AR panel’s 70%. The different Ownership structure values can be 
explained by the fact that the percentage of DAX30 companies is higher in the 
CMC panel, and for the DAX30 index the free float is one selection criterion.3 
The Financial leverage, measured as the total debt to total equity, is lower for the 
CMC panel (2,27) compared to 3,03 for the AR panel. This indicates that compa-
nies in the AR panel are more dependent on external creditors than those in the 
CMC panel. Except for the number of KPIs per firm year, all numbers for the in-
dependent variables are retrieved from the Datastream Worldscope database. 
[Table 4 about here] 
                                               
3
 According to Deutsche Börse index guidelines, the free float market capitalisation is one selec-
tion criterion (Deutsche Börse, 2016). 
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5.2 Univariate Analysis 
In table 5 (AR data panel) and table 6 (CMC data panel) the correlations between 
the variables for our two data panels are reported separately. The significant uni-
variate correlations for the AR data panel give a strong indication that Firm size is 
positively associated with high consistency measures in the management report 
(CIMR) and the annual report (CIAR). The correlation matrix shows that CIMR as 
well as CIAR are significantly higher in the last two fiscal years of our analysed 
period. Firm complexity and Reporting complexity are therefore significantly posi-
tively associated with our consistency measures. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The univariate correlation analysis in table 6 for the CMC data panel does not 
support the relationship between size and consistent KPI reporting. However, the 
significantly positive relationship of consistency with the last two fiscal years in 
our investigation is supported as well. In addition, the CMC correlation matrix 
provides evidence that, as expected, Profitability is positively related to consistent 
financial reporting. The results regarding our complexity measures are the same in 
the CMC correlation matrix as in the AR correlation matrix. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Multicollinearity is checked with a variance inflation factor (VIF). The dummy 
variables Industry: Other and MDAX membership are omitted due to exact collin-
earity and will therefore not be discussed in the coming section. 
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5.3 Multivariate Analysis 
The regression results for all three dependent variables, CIMR, CIAR and CICMC, are 
presented in table 7. The results indicate that the independent variables explain 
22% of the variations in the CIMR model, 19% of the variations of the CIAR model 
and 15% of the variations of the CICMC model. 
As predicted, the sign of the Firm size variable is positive for all three models, 
whereby only significant (at a 5% level) as an explanatory variable for CIMR. The 
results concerning Size differ from other studies (e.g. Hossain & Mitra, 2004) that 
find evidence for a positive relationship between disclosure quality and the size of 
a firm. Our statistically insignificant results for CIAR and CICMC and the uncon-
vincing significance for CIMR can be interpreted to mean that all companies, no 
matter how big they are, are capable of communicating financial KPIs consistent-
ly. Our results do not support the hypothesis that Firm complexity is negatively 
associated with consistent KPI reporting. The Firm complexity variables in all 
three models are positive (and for the CIAR significant at a low 10% level). Taking 
into account that we use the number of segments compared to the average number 
of segments as a proxy for Firm complexity, we can conclude that firms with an 
abnormally high number of business segments are capable of reporting KPIs on a 
segment basis at the same consistency level as companies with a relatively low 
number of segments. Our result supports the finding of previous studies (Cooke, 
1989; Haniffa & Cook, 2002; Courtis, 1978) that companies with a high level of 
complexity have to disclose more information to ease the information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders. The Reporting complexity results contrast our hy-
pothesis that complexity measured by the number of KPIs per firm depresses dis-
closure quality in terms of consistency. We find strong evidence that more com-
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plex financial reporting (e.g. the number of KPIs in financial disclosures) is linked 
to higher consistency for the models CIAR (p<0.05) and CICMC (p<0.001). These 
results can be interpreted to mean that companies with an above average number 
of KPIs take more effort to report these in all necessary sections of capital market 
communication than companies with a below average number of KPIs. In line 
with the literature, we find significant evidence that profitable companies have 
high quality disclosure concerning consistency (p<0.05 for CIAR and for CICMC). 
The results regarding profitability can be interpreted to mean that profitable firms 
report the favourable development of financial KPIs more often and therefore 
more consistently in capital market communication. We find inconclusive results 
for the Ownership structure hypothesis. For CIMR, we find, as expected, a positive 
relationship between the percentage of the free float of shares and consistent KPI 
reporting (p<0.001). Concerning CIAR and CICMC, the results are not statistically 
significant and inconclusive regarding the sign of the coefficients (a negative sign 
for the CIAR model and a positive one for the CICMC model). We can therefore 
argue that the level of corporate governance has no significant impact on con-
sistent reporting of financial KPIs. Financial leverage is not found to be a signifi-
cant predicator of consistent KPI disclosure in all three models. Although our re-
sults differ from our hypothesis that the more firms need capital markets for fund-
ing, the better the disclosure quality, an explanation could be that KPI reporting is 
particularly important for equity analysts due to the protective power regarding 
future profitability (Dorestani & Rezaeee, 2011) and not so much regarding credit 
risk indicators like current liquidity. Aside from slight evidence of a positive rela-
tionship between No membership of a stock listing index (p<0.1) the results do not 
indicate any strong or conclusive relationship between index membership and 
consistent KPI reporting. T-statistics for industry type dummies for CIAR and 
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CICMC are insignificant, but significant at a 5% level for the manufacturing indus-
try and at a 10% level for the services industry in the CIMR model. In both cases, 
the industry type is in a positive relationship with the consistent use of KPIs in the 
management report. The hypothesis that capital market communication improves 
over time is supported by all three models (p<0.001). In line with our descriptive 
finding that the consistency score improves continuously, the multivariate results 
can be interpreted to mean that companies used the introduction of GAS 20 to 
improve capital market communication in general. This interpretation is supported 
by the fact that we see strong positive relationships between all three disclosure 
index variables for the fiscal years 2013 and 2014, whereby the application of 
GAS 20 was mandatory from the fiscal year 2013 onwards. 
6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the consistent use of KPIs in capital 
market communication in Germany and the association of consistency measures 
with firm-specific determinants. The data panel includes 396 firm years for the 
period 2009 to 2014. We construct three proxies to investigate the level of con-
sistency in financial KPI reporting: the CIMR (Consistency index for management 
report), the CIAR (Consistency index for annual report) and the CICMC (Consistency 
index for capital market communication). 
Firstly, the empirical investigation reveals that there is a high degree of incon-
sistency in terms of financial KPI reporting. This finding applies regardless of 
whether the management report (CIMR), the annual report (CIAR) or the capital 
market communication including the investor relations presentations (CICMC) are 
analysed. All three consistency indices improve significantly as of 2013, which 
was the first application year of the GAS 20 “Group Management Report”. Sec-
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ondly, the paper identifies through a random effects regression model that Report-
ing complexity and the Profitability are significantly positively associated with the 
level of consistent KPI reporting. The results regarding Reporting complexity sup-
port the theory that a company acting in a complex environment spends consider-
ably more resources on an effective management information system in order to 
help monitor the complex organisation (Haniffa & Cook, 2002) and provides use-
ful information to investors and creditors. The association regarding Profitability 
is an empirically analysed disclosure pattern and theoretically anchored in the 
signalling theory that states that companies are inclined to disclose positive infor-
mation in a detailed manner. The paper finds only weak evidence that Size or Firm 
complexity positively impacts the consistent reporting of KPIs in the German capi-
tal market. The use of external funding (Financial leverage) and Ownership struc-
ture as a proxy for agency costs (the relative free float of shares) is almost statisti-
cally insignificant determinants of consistent KPI reporting. The empirical results 
reveal no convincing relationship between the index listing of the company and 
the consistent reporting of financial KPIs. The membership of an industry is only 
identified as a significant explanatory variable for the CIMR. Manufacturing com-
panies are more consistent with KPI reporting in the management report than 
companies in other industries. This result could not be replicated for the annual 
report or all capital market communication. 
The contribution of this paper is primarily to analyse the status quo of consistent 
financial KPI reporting in an advanced capital market like Germany and to present 
empirical evidence regarding relevant firm characteristics of consistent financial 
KPI reporting. The meagre results regarding consistency indicate that standard 
setters and regulation bodies should exert more effort to align the different defini-
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tions of the key aspects of disclosure requirements (e.g. KPI definitions in local 
requirements regarding management reports and international accounting stand-
ards on consolidated financial statements) and enforce the consistent application. 
Our results support the IASB by drafting an internationally accepted accounting 
standard on management reports, which should be a big step towards eliminating 
inconsistency between KPI definitions in various reporting regulations. The find-
ing that the GAS clarification on management reporting significantly improved 
consistency confirms this argument. The findings regarding the firm-specific 
characteristics that drive consistency should help standard setters and regulatory 
bodies to improve the regulatory setting of KPI reporting. Of particular interest 
should be the finding that firm size is not a strong explanatory variable of con-
sistent reporting. 
Future research should analyse the consistent reporting of financial as well as non-
financial KPIs in additional capital market settings to strengthen our understand-
ing of the explanatory factors of consistent capital market communication. Alt-
hough there are several studies about the value relevance of financial disclosures, 
the value relevance of KPIs has not yet received much attention in academia 
(Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; Elzahar et al., 2015). But for a comprehensive under-
standing of financial KPIs, the value relevance of KPIs has to be analysed. 
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Appendix 
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Firms Observations
Initial sample of DAX30 + MDAX entities 2009 -2014 80 480
Less bank and insurance entities 7 42
Less missing annual reports 4 24
Less entities not domiciled in Germany 3 18
Final AR sample for the period 2009 to 2014 66 396
Less missing investor relation presentations 33 198
Final CMC sample for the period 2009 to 2014 33 198
Sample size
Table 1
Sample selection process
Industry Number % Number %
Manufacturing 240 60,61 132 66,67
Services 90 22,73 36 18,18
Other 66 16,67 30 15,15
Index Number % Number %
DAX30 156 39,39 102 51,52
MDAX 212 53,54 92 46,46
None 28 7,07 4 2,02
Final AR panel Final CMC panel
Final AR panel Final CMC panel
Table 2
Distribution of sample by industry type and stock market index
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Variable n Mean St.dev. n Mean St.dev.
Firm size 396 16,07 1,53 198 16,45 1,61
Firm complexity 396 1,00 0,43 198 1,00 0,42
Reporting complexity 396 1,00 0,75 198 1,00 0,65
Profitability 396 0,12 0,14 198 0,12 0,17
Ownership structure 396 0,70 0,27 198 0,76 0,24
Financial leverage 396 3,03 6,97 198 2,27 1,60
AR panel CMC panel
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for independent variables
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Model No.
Dependent Variable CIMR CIAR CICMC
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant -0,438 -1,50 0,073 0,23 0,324 0,77
Firm Size 0,033 * 1,71 0,014 0,71 0,000 0,01
Firm Complexity 0,070 * 1,69 0,069 1,58 0,048 0,78
Reporting Complexity -0,013 -0,76 0,039 ** 2,18 0,093 *** 3,81
Profitability 0,074 0,99 0,194 ** 2,46 0,198 ** 2,20
Ownership Structure 0,111 * 1,88 -0,069 -1,10 0,033 0,33
Financial Leverage -0,002 -0,57 0,000 0,05 0,009 0,75
DAX30 Index-listing 0,015 0,23 -0,069 -0,99 0,053 0,82
MDAX Index-listing na na na na na na
No Index-listing 0,077 * 1,66 -0,042 -0,85 0,012 0,14
Industry Manufacturing 0,127 ** 1,97 0,078 1,12 0,012 0,12
Industry Services 0,134 * 1,77 0,102 1,26 0,011 0,09
Industry Other na na na na na na
Fiscal Year 2009 na na na na na na
Fiscal Year 2010 0,021 0,73 0,027 0,92 0,043 1,21
Fiscal Year 2011 0,023 0,83 0,027 0,90 0,060 * 1,66
Fiscal Year 2012 0,050 * 1,77 0,059 ** 1,99 0,068 * 1,92
Fiscal Year 2013 0,196 *** 6,67 0,188 *** 6,08 0,185 *** 5,05
Fiscal Year 2014 0,211 *** 7,01 0,222 *** 6,98 0,155 *** 4,12
Firm Years
Adj. R2 0,2157 0,1851 0,1536
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating equations (I.), (II.) and (III.) as an Randome effects regression.  ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
396 396 198
Table 7
Random effects model results
(I.) (II.) (III.)
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Consistency index example - CIMR
KPI name Group KPI MD&A Outlook
 KPI 
consistency 
score
1 EBITDA No 2 2 1
2 Economic value added No 0 0 0
3 Cash flow Yes 1 0 0,5
KPI consistency score CI MR  for a firm year 0,50
Consistency index example - CIAR
KPI name Group KPI MD&A Outlook
Segment
reporting
 KPI 
consistency 
score
1 EBITDA No 2 2 1 0,3
2 Economic value added No 0 0 0 0
3 Cash flow Yes 1 0 na 0,5
KPI consistency score CI AR  for a firm year 0,28
Consistency index example - CICMC
KPI name Group KPI MD&A Outlook
Segment
reporting
Investor 
relations
presentation
 KPI 
consistency 
score
1 EBITDA No 2 2 1 1 0,86
2 Economic value added No 0 0 0 0 0
3 Cash flow Yes 1 0 na 0 0,3
KPI consistency score CI CMC  for a firm year 0,40
Appendix 1
Examples of consistency indices measuring
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THE CAPITAL MARKET RELEVANCE OF CONSISTENT KEY 
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR REPORTING: PRELIMINARY  
EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, I analyse the link between the consistent use of financial key per-
formance indicators (KPIs) in capital market communication and firm value. To 
test consistent KPI reporting, I use self-constructed consistency indices of the 
largest German listed companies. The study covers the period from 2009 to 2014 
and consists of up to 372 firm years. I measure firm value as the ratio of market 
value of equity to the book value of equity. For the majority of capital market 
communication, I do not find a significant relationship between consistent KPI 
reporting and firm value. For a link between a consistent index covering the man-
agement report and consolidated financial statements and firm value, I find a neg-
ative association. These puzzling results, from a traditional perspective, support 
the view that there are important limitations and unanswered questions. I put these 
findings into a theoretical and empirical perspective and suggest future research 
directions. 
 
 
Keywords:  Value relevance; Firm value; Disclosure; Key performance indica-
tors; Germany 
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1 Introduction 
Key performance indicators (KPIs) form the basis of performance assessment of 
capital market oriented companies (Fee, 2015) and attract increasing attention 
from standard setters and regulatory authorities. In particular, the European Union 
(EU, 2003) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, 2010) have 
strengthened the disclosure requirements for KPIs in the recent past. According to 
German Accounting Standard 20, German companies have to disclose the KPIs 
that are used for internal management purposes and have to base the performance 
discussion and the business outlook in the disclosed management report on these 
KPIs. Business segment reporting according to IFRS 8 “Operating segments” in 
the consolidated financial statements as part of the annual report is based on these 
KPIs. The use of the KPIs of the internal management system in the voluntary 
part of the financial reporting, such as investor relations slides, is the logical con-
sequence of consistent capital market communication. This consistent use of fi-
nancial KPIs in the entire capital market communication comprising the manage-
ment report, the consolidated financial statements, and the investor relations 
presentations has so far not attracted much attention from academia. The most 
recent research focused the analysis on KPI disclosure quality in annual reports 
for UK listed companies (Elzahar et al., 2015). 
With my empirical value relevance study of consistent financial KPI reporting, I 
contribute to the research stream that strives to highlight the complex interplay 
between accounting and capital markets (Barth et al., 2001). In my study, con-
sistency is defined as the consistent use of financial KPIs across different parts of 
the capital market communication of year-end results. I base the value relevance 
analysis on three uniquely constructed consistency indices for German companies 
spanning the period 2009 to 2014. The development and determinants of these 
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indices are discussed in Jana et al. (2016). The paper concludes that a low level of 
consistency in terms of KPI reporting in capital market communication persists 
and that further efforts from standard setters and enforcement authorities are nec-
essary to improve consistent KPI reporting across the different parts of capital 
market communication. 
The results of my study do not support the value relevance of consistent KPI re-
porting for the bulk of capital market communication for the largest listed compa-
nies in Germany. The empirical link between consistent KPI reporting and firm 
value is not significant for management reports and all capital market communica-
tion. In contrast with my original hypotheses that consistent financial KPI report-
ing has a positive impact on firm value for all parts of capital market communica-
tion, I find a negative association between the level of consistency in terms of KPI 
usage in annual reports and firm value. I put my results in the perspective of simi-
lar results regarding the inconclusive value relevance of disclosure quality (e.g. 
Botosan, 1997) and give guidance for future research on consistent KPI reporting. 
In particular, I argue that future research should extend the underlying database to 
smaller companies with a lower analyst following. For these kinds of companies, 
the disclosure quality of capital market communication is more important due to 
the lack of sophisticated financial analysts that are capable to process inconsistent 
financial information. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the current litera-
ture on value relevance of disclosure quality and the hypotheses tested in this 
study. In Section 3, I describe the database, the variable measurement and the re-
gression model I used. Section 4 examines the association between firm value and 
the level of consistency in capital market communication, while Section 5 covers 
conclusion, limitations, and future research opportunities. 
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2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
A rich stream of accounting literature analyses the effect of disclosure quality on 
firm value (e.g. Leuz and Verrechia, 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 
2010; Lang and Maffett, 2010). The use of market capitalization as the dependent 
variable for value relevance testing of disclosure information is quite common 
(Hassan et al., 2009; Lang et al., 2003). These studies hypothesize that better dis-
closure quality is positively associated with higher market capitalization due to 
lower information asymmetry between investors and managers. This line of think-
ing is firmly based on economic theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and leads to 
the theoretical result that the value of companies should be positively affected by 
improved financial transparency and disclosure quality. Despite this theoretical 
foundation, the empirical testing of this link has so far been inconclusive (Jiao, 
2014). For example, Daske (2006) does not find a value effect for companies with 
better disclosure quality. In contrast with empirical evidence that high quality fi-
nancial reporting has a positive effect on firm value (Baek et al., 2004; Cheung et 
al., 2010) some studies even show negative associations between disclosure quali-
ty and firm value (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). To contribute to 
these value relevance studies, I test whether the consistent usage of KPIs in capital 
market communication as proxy for disclosure quality has a positive impact on 
firm value. I follow Lins (2003) and Hassan et al. (2009) in using the ratio of 
market value of equity to book value equity as the dependent variable for firm 
value. If the market value is less (greater) than the book value of the equity, it 
signals an undervaluation (overvaluation) of the company. For the purpose of this 
study, the market-to-book value ratio (MTBR) is measured as the average share 
price for the three months after the fiscal year in order to ensure that the market 
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prices reflect the disclosed accounting information. The numerator book value is 
the financial year-end number. 
In order to analyse the value relevance of consistent financial KPI reporting, I use 
three unique consistency indices (Jana et al., 2016) as explanatory variables: Con-
sistency index for management report (CIMR); Consistency index for annual report 
(CIAR); Consistency index for capital market communication (CICMC). The indices 
are constructed through an item-based dichotomous procedure in which the item 
scores 1 if the main KPI according to the internal management system section of 
the annual report is used in specific parts of the disclosure, and 0 otherwise. The 
indices are built on each other: the CIMR covers the management report according 
to HGB and the CIAR measures the consistency of the annual report, including the 
CIMR and KPI reporting of the segment reporting according to IFRS 8 of the con-
solidated financial statements. The CICMC covers the annual report, including the 
management report and segment reporting, plus the investor relations presenta-
tions for year-end earning calls. For further details and examples regarding the 
consistency indices, I refer to Jana et al. (2016). 
The transparent and consistent reporting of KPIs should provide actual and poten-
tial investors with information to let them make efficient investment decisions 
(IASB, 2010). Hence, consistent KPI usage in capital market communication 
should increase the demand for shares of the reporting entity and increase the 
firm’s market capitalization. Previous studies (Elzahar et al,. 2015; Dorestani and 
Rezaee, 2011) found empirical evidence for economic consequences of high 
quality KPI reporting and firm value. Elzahar (2015) reports a positive relation-
ship between the disclosure quality of financial KPIs and firm value for a sample 
of UK listed companies for the period 2006 to 2010. The value relevance of KPIs 
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for US listed companies is analysed by Dorestani and Rezaee (2011). They found 
a link between a change in KPI reporting and the accuracy of analyst forecasts. 
Based on previous studies and the theoretical benefits of better financial reporting 
quality, I developed the following hypothesis: 
H1: The level of consistent financial KPI reporting is positively associated with 
the firm value of a company. 
I incorporate a few control variables in my value relevance model framework: 
firm size, profitability, financial leverage, and growth. Previous studies found that 
the firm size measured by total assets is positively associated with the market cap-
italization of firms (Berk, 1995; Bowen et al., 2002; Lins, 2003). Following these 
empirical findings and the theoretical argument of economies of scale in general, I 
hypothesize that larger firms report more consistently than smaller firms. I proxy 
the firm size with the natural log of the book value and assume a positive relation-
ship between the variable and the dependent variable MTBR. Due to the theoreti-
cal basis of profitability as one of the main explanatory variables for firm value 
(Olson, 1995) and various empirical findings (Orens et al., 2009; Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2016) I control for profitability in my model with the ratio return on 
equity calculated as net income divided by total equity. Regarding financial lever-
age, I assume that a higher need of external funding lessens the agency problem 
due to intensified creditor monitoring and consequently increases the value of the 
equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To capture this leverage effect on the market 
value of a firm, I proxy the financial leverage as the ratio of total debt to total eq-
uity and expect a positive sign for the variable. According to Hassan et al. (2009) 
and Lang et al. (2003) the growth momentum of companies has a statistically sig-
nificant impact on their firm value. I control for this growth effect with the incor-
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poration of the sales growth measured as the sales in the current fiscal year divid-
ed by sales in the previous fiscal year in my model. Finally, I incorporate dum-
mies for fiscal years and industry membership. 
3 Data Collection and Variable Measurement 
3.1 Panel Data Structure 
I analyse a data set of the largest German listed companies over the period from 
2009 to 2014. The panel consists of the 80 companies listed on the stock market 
indices DAX30 and MDAX in December 2014. In line with the empirical litera-
ture on value relevance, I exclude financial services firms because of industry-
specific disclosure requirements and practices (Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). Due to 
the centrepiece function of the management report for our KPI consistency indi-
ces, I must exclude companies that are not based in Germany because they are not 
required to prepare and disclose a management report according to HGB. Further 
data restrictions (e.g. missing annual reports and capital markets data) also limited 
the data panel. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The availability of investor relations is quite limited and I therefore work with two 
panels: The annual reports (AR) panel consists of 62 companies, while the capital 
markets communication (CMC) panel contains only 33 companies. The models 
with the explanatory variables CIMR and CIAR are analysed with the data panel AM 
because both variables cover only the consistency of KPI reporting within the 
annual report. To analyse the value relevance of capital market communication in 
its entirety (CICMC) including the investor relations presentations, I use the data 
panel CMC. 
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The industry structure of the AR panel and CMC panel is reported in Table 2. In 
both panels, the manufacturer category represents the majority of analysed com-
panies (61,29% and 66,67%, respectively). 
[Table 2 about here] 
3.2 Variables Measurement 
The variable data for the two panels is reported in Table 3. I follow the literature 
(Barth et al., 2008; Elzahar et al., 2015) and deflate all financial variables by the 
number of outstanding shares. The dependent variable MTBR as proxy for firm 
value with 2,4 average for the AR panel and 2,5 for the CMC panel indicates that 
the reported book values of equity represent less than 50% of the market value as 
perceived by investors. All three consistency indices indicate a high level of in-
consistent financial KPI reporting: the analysis shows average indices of 47% for 
CIMR, 49% for CIAR, and 50% for CICMC for the period 2009 to 2014. These num-
bers can be interpreted as that the KPI reporting is only consistent in 47%, 49%, 
or 50% of cases. The index scores for the entire period varied from 0,00 to 1,00, 
which means that companies sometimes do not use the supposed significant fi-
nancial KPIs in corporate financial disclosures at all (index score 0), or the use of 
the financial KPIs occurs in all possible instances in the financial communication 
(index score 1). The data points to initial evidence that the level of consistency in 
capital market communication (50%) and the annual report (49%) is higher than 
in the management report (47%). The average firm size reported as the natural log 
of total assets is in both panels comparable with 16,09 in the AR panel and 16,45 
in the CMC panel. The high standard deviation of 1,68 and 1,96 for this variable 
shows how diverse companies are in terms of firm size. The profitability with a 
12% return on equity is identical for both data panels. The growth momentum of 
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the firms, measured as the ratio of current sales divided by the sales in the previ-
ous fiscal year, is 5,44 and 5,78, respectively. These numbers indicate that the 
biggest German listed companies on average experienced a healthy growth mo-
mentum in the analysed time period. The financial leverage, with 3,00 on average 
for the AR panel, is significantly higher than the leverage of 2,27 in the CMC 
panel. The difference indicates that firms in the AR panel are more dependent on 
external funding than those in the CMC panel. 
The data for the consistency indices are hand collected from the annual reports 
and investor relation slides. All other data is obtained from the Datastream 
Worldscope database. 
3.3 Regression Model 
The following models have been developed to analyse the value relevance of the 
three consistency indices while controlling for the abovementioned variables: 
 ܯ݋݈݀݁ ͳ:   ܨ� = α + �ଵܴܲ + �ଶܨܮ + �ଷܩܴ + �ସܨܵ + �ହ�ܰ + �଺ܨ� + �଻ܥ�ெ�  
 ܯ݋݈݀݁ ʹ:   ܨ� = α + �ଵܴܲ + �ଶܨܮ + �ଷܩܴ + �ସܨܵ + �ହ�ܰ + �଺ܨ� + �଻ܥ��� 
 ܯ݋݈݀݁ ͵:   ܨ� = α + �ଵܴܲ + �ଶܨܮ + �ଷܩܴ + �ସܨܵ + �ହ�ܰ + �଺ܨ� + �଻ܥ��ெ�  
Where: FV = Firm value; PR = Profitability; FL = Financial leverage; GR = 
Growth; FS = Firm size; IN = Dummy variables for industries (manufacturing, 
services or other); FY = Dummy variables for the fiscal years 2009 to 2014; CIMR 
= Consistency index for management report; CIAR = Consistency index for annual 
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report; CICMC = Consistency index for capital market communication. The varia-
bles are defined in Appendix 2. 
The model is based on prior studies (Ousama et al., 2011; Orens et al., 2009; Has-
san et al., 2009). The theoretical framework to combine financial data with non-
financial information was introduced by Ohlson (1995). In this study, the con-
sistency indices are used as non-financial information that capital market partici-
pants use for investment decisions. Taking into account the results of the Breusch-
Pagan test that my data suffers from unobserved heterogeneity, I use as a fixed 
effects estimator with generalized least squares. The effectiveness of the random 
effects estimator was rejected after performing the Hausmann test. 
4 Results and discussion 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
In Table 3 and Table 4, the correlations for the two data panels AR and CMC are 
presented. The AR panel is used to test whether the consistent usage of KPIs in 
management reports (CIMR) or annual reports (CIAR) is value relevant and the cor-
responding correlations are reported in Table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The correlation data for the value relevance testing of capital market communica-
tion in its entirety (CICMC) is reported in Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The tables report the correlation between firm value and the three consistency 
indices as well as the additional explanatory variables. For all three consistency 
indices, the correlation matrix reports significant positive relationships between 
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the consistent usage of financial KPIs in financial reporting and firm value (CIMR 
= 0,111; CIAR = 0,130; CICMC = 0,220). The signs of the other continuous variables 
in both correlation matrices show the expected positive relationships. Based on 
the univariate analysis, I expect that the consistent reporting of KPIs, the profita-
bility, the financial leverage, the growth momentum, and the firm size are posi-
tively associated with the value of the firm. 
The multicollinearity is checked by computing the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
The dummy variables for industry type are omitted due to exact collinearity and 
are therefore not part of the analysis discussion. 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The fixed effects regression model results are reported in Table 6. The specified 
models can explain 25% in the firm value variation in Model 1 (CIMR) and Model 
2 (CIAR), while Model 3 (CICMC) reaches an explanatory power of 35%. 
The independent variable Profitability is positive in all three models and signifi-
cant at a 5% level with the explanatory variables CIMR and CIAR. For Model 3, 
with CICMC as the explanatory variable for non-financial information, the statisti-
cal relationship is only significant at a 1% level. These results are in line with my 
hypotheses and are empirically as well as theoretically supported by various aca-
demic studies (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). The growth momentum captured by the 
variable Growth represents a positive and significant association with firm value 
in all three models (CIMR and CIAR (p<0.05); CICMC (p<0.01)). This empirical re-
sult supports the investment concept of growth stocks and demonstrates that com-
panies with an above average growth rate can on average enjoy more favorable 
market values (Baumann et al., 1998). I find no empirical support for the notion 
that financial leverage as a proxy for dependence on external funding has a signif-
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icant association with firm value. Because my data sample originates from a fairly 
developed capital market environment and a strong corporate governance culture 
can be assumed for the selected firms, it could be argued that the usual positive 
effect of external monitoring by debt holder does not play such an important role 
in Germany in terms of market valuation (Lins, 2003). The firm size results con-
trast my hypothesis that higher total assets of a company correlate with a higher 
firm value. This result could be explained by the fact that the panel structure com-
prises fairly large companies because all companies are listed on the major Ger-
man stock market indices and belong to the biggest companies in Germany. 
The results regarding the explanatory variables of consistent KPI reporting are 
puzzling and reflect the conflicting empirical results from the academic literature 
on value relevance of disclosure quality in general (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). In 
all three models, the sign for the consistency variables (CIMR, CIAR and CICMC) are 
negative. These results reject my hypothesis that the consistent usage of KPI in 
capital market communication has a positive impact on firm value. The coeffi-
cients for the KPI reporting in annual reports (CIAR) and in capital market com-
munication (CICMC) are statistically insignificant. Although I formulated the hy-
pothesis of a positive empirical relationship between consistent KPI reporting and 
the market value of companies, I do find theoretical explanations for my results. 
As outlined above, my study covers the biggest stock market listed companies in 
Germany. As a prerequisite to joining the DAX30 and MDAX indices, the com-
panies must have above average market capitalization and above average market 
liquidity in terms of share trading (Deutsche Börse, 2016). These kinds of charac-
teristics lead to above average analyst coverage. In general, analysts are quite so-
phisticated as well as capable of processing financial disclosures efficiently, even 
in tough reporting environments like inconsistent KPI reporting, and nevertheless 
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conclude beneficial investment advice. Consequently, empirical evidence shows 
that an economic consequence like firm value is more sensitive to disclosure qual-
ity if companies are not covered by analysts because actual and potential investors 
lack the information processing capabilities of professional financial intermediar-
ies like analysts (Dorestani and Rezaee, 2011; Botosan 1997). The results of 
Model 2 with the consistency index CIAR reports a significant negative relation-
ship between consistent KPI reporting in annual reports and firm value (p<0.05). 
Although this result contradicts my hypothesis of a positive relationship between 
consistency and market valuation, the negative association can also be defended 
by economic theory. Wagenhofer (2004) explains that it is possible that increased 
disclosure quality could lead to negative economic consequences due to the com-
petitive disadvantage resulting from the dissemination of sensitive information. 
The consistency index CIAR covers the management report and business segment 
reporting, which leads to the argument that the distribution of sensitive KPI in-
formation in the segment reporting note could potentially have a negative effect 
on the company’s market value. This line of thinking is supported by the empiri-
cal finding of Bugeja et al. (2015). These authors demonstrate empirically that 
successful firms are reluctant to provide segment information when most of their 
segments are profitable. Owing to the assumed decision usefulness of the KPI 
information in the business segment note and the dependence of the CIAR on this 
information, this could be the case for the consistency index CIAR model 2. 
4.3 Robustness Check 
As mentioned above, my multivariate regression model is based on the Ohlson 
model (Ohlson, 1995). Although I use the model as the foundation of my regres-
sion, I refined it according to various studies that developed the model further 
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(Ousama et al., 2011; Orens et al., 2009; Hassan et al., 2009). In its original set-
ting, the model represents the market value of firm (MV) as a linear function of 
book value of equity (BV), net income (NI), and other non-financial information 
(OFI). 
 ܯ� =  �଴ +  �ଵܤ� + �ଶܰ� +  �ଷܱܨ� 
 
To test the robustness of my regression results, I used the Ohlson model which is 
still used in its original setting (e.g. Elzahar et al., 2015). I recalculate all three 
models with the different explanatory variables (CIMR, CIAR and CICMC) as other 
non-financial information (not tabulated). The results confirm the results dis-
cussed above. 
5 Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research 
This empirical study uses panel data to investigate the relationship between firm 
value and the consistent use of financial KPIs in capital market communication in 
Germany. The panel consists of 372 firm years for the period 2009 to 2014. I use 
self-developed and collected consistency indices (Jana et al., 2016) for manage-
ment report (CIMR), annual report (CIAR) and capital market communication 
(CICMC) as explanatory variables for firm value. The regression model is specified 
to control for firm size, profitability, financial leverage, and growth. My results 
show no significant association between firm value and the level of consistency in 
the management report (CIMR) and the capital market communication (CICMC). 
The results regarding CIAR show a negative significant relationship between the 
level of consistency in the annual report and the firm value. 
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Although the paper provides preliminary evidence that the consistent use of KPIs 
in a large part of the capital market communication does not have an effect on the 
stock valuation of companies, standard setting bodies (IASB, 2010), regulatory 
authorities (FREP, 2014), and financial analysts (AICPA, 1993) articulate in vari-
ous forms the need for consistent capital market communication. To some extent, 
my results are in line with other empirical studies that analyzse the economic ef-
fects of disclosure quality and find no such link (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). 
Despite the negative report of my results in respect of positive value effects on 
companies with consistent KPI reporting, I do not see the quest of relevant KPI 
reporting undermined by my study. My results are based on the largest listed 
companies in Germany; therefore a key limitation of my study is the focus on 
companies with a high analyst following. Previous research demonstrated that the 
economic effects of below average disclosure quality for companies with a high 
analyst following is insignificant, because analysts are highly sophisticated in 
processing even low quality financial disclosure information and nevertheless 
formulate efficient investment advice (Botosan, 1997). This causal relationship is 
not relevant for smaller companies with a lower analyst following, because the 
informed and sophisticated analysts are not in place and the disclosure quality 
therefore matters more for investment decisions. Future research should extend 
the data panel towards small capitalized companies in Germany, such as SDAX 
and TecDAX companies. Future research could also extend the analysis to addi-
tional proxies for economic effects on disclosure. In particular the testing of mar-
ket liquidity and the cost of capital should be a fruitful contribution to the stream 
of academic literature on the link between disclosure quality and capital market 
effects. 
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While it is not said that the negative relationship between annual report consisten-
cy and firm value holds true for an extended panel with small capitalized firms, 
the result of this study with fairly large listed companies shows the importance of 
segmental information. My findings provide preliminary evidence that companies 
structure their financial reporting towards hiding the KPI information of profitable 
segments. This finding supports the current efforts of enforcement agencies in 
Europe to ensure that companies report their KPIs consistently across all capital 
market communication. 
Finally, it might be of interest to conduct an empirical study on the economic ef-
fects of consistent KPI reporting for capital markets other than Germany. Of par-
ticular interest would be studies in countries where IFRS is also mandatory for 
capital market oriented companies in order to support the IASB in developing a 
widely accepted and beneficial accounting standard for a globally harmonized 
management report (IASB, 2005). 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Firms Observations
Initial sample of DAX30 + MDAX entities 2009-2014 80 480
Less bank and insurance entities 7 42
Less missing annual reports 4 24
Less entities not domiciled in Germany 3 18
Less missing capital market data 4 24
Final AR sample for the period 2009-2014 62 372
Less missing investor relation presentations 29 198
Final CMC sample for the period 2009-2014 33 174
Sample size
Table 1
Sample selection process
Industry Number % Number %
Manufacturing 228 61,29 132 66,67
Services 84 22,58 36 18,18
Other 60 16,13 30 15,15
Final AR panel Final CMC panel
Table 2
Distribution of sample by industry type
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Model number
Dependent variable Firm value Firm value Firm value
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 13,278 1,0331 13,849 1,064 36,403 1,495
Profitability 0,972 ** 1,983 1,077 ** 2,272 0,867 * 1,969
Financial leverage 0,026 0,6197 0,022 0,549 0,087 1,196
Growth 0,013 * 1,9061 0,013 * 1,850 0,028 ** 2,095
Firm size -0,706 -0,8715 -0,730 -0,894 -2,099 -1,417
CI MR -0,030 -0,1039
CI AR -0,528 ** -2,377
CI CMC -0,378 -0,900
Year dummies
Firm years
R2
Included Included Included
Table 6
Fixed effects model results
(I.) (II.) (III.)
0,2461 0,2461 0,3541
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating equations (I.), (II.), and (III.) as a random effects regression.  ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, with two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
372 372 198
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